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THE END OF NOTICE:  SECRETS AND LIENS IN COMMERCIAL 
FINANCE LAW
Jonathan C. Lipson©
This article explores important recent changes in the way that we treat personal property in 
commercial finance transactions.  Among other things, these changes reduce or eliminate the obligation 
to give notice of interests in personal property when it is used in commercial finance transactions (as, 
e.g., collateral for a loan).
A principal purpose of notice-filing has been to deter the creation of secret liens, interests in property 
that are neither recorded nor otherwise readily observable.  Secret liens are universally castigated as 
abhorrent.  
Yet, two recent sets of legislative developments suggest that we may care much less about the 
problem of secret liens than we might acknowledge.  First, recent revisions to Article 9 of the U.C.C 
(which governs many commercial finance transactions) tolerate secret liens as to such increasingly 
important assets as data, intellectual property, bank accounts, and securities.
Second, states have recently begun to enact non-uniform legislation designed to promote “asset 
securitizations.”  This legislation gives fully-preemptive effect to the parties’ contracts, and would 
therefore appear to displace rules on notice-filing that might otherwise apply.  They effectively end the 
obligation to give notice.
The article considers how we have come to diminish the role of notice-filing, and what that might 
mean.   I argue that tolerance of secret liens challenges a deeply-held intuition about the relationship 
between property rights and notice obligations.  This intuition enjoys both a new theoretical cache and a 
long lineage.   I also suggest that we have become increasingly tolerant of secret liens because  we have 
been seduced by a series of economic arguments about the alleged inefficiencies of notice-filing.  I 
consider and reject most (but not all) of the economic arguments as incomplete or speculative.
The article then suggests that notice-filing systems may perform at least two important informational 
functions not fully considered by critics of these systems.  First, they will act as proxy for the information 
that might otherwise be generated within tightly-knit merchant communities.  Second, they may have 
important behavioral consequences both for those required to provide the notice and for the audience for 
the information thus provided.  The article therefore counsels caution in enacting legislation that would 
diminish or dilute notice-filing in commercial finance transactions.
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THE END OF NOTICE:  SECRETS AND LIENS IN COMMERCIAL
FINANCE LAW
One of the Ten Commandments of Mercantile Law is that an effective 
[notice] filing system is the center pole that holds up the entire personal 
property tent.1
[I]t is certainly observable that [notice] filing offices tend to collect a good 
deal of dust between the visits of creditors seeking information . . .2
Commentators have wondered for some time just what it is we want the 
[notice] filing system to achieve.3
Introduction 
Pity the poor financing statement.  
This much-maligned document was once the centerpiece of most important 
commercial finance transactions.  Until recently, to make generally enforceable 
any loan or similar transaction involving personal property, this simple statement 
identifying the borrower, the lender and the property involved had to be filed in a 
public office designated by applicable law (usually Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code).4  If the form was properly completed and filed, and the 
underlying contracts were executed, the lender’s rights in the borrower’s property 
would be “perfected” – enforceable not only against the borrower but also against 
anyone else seeking to stake a claim in that property, such as buyers, other 
creditors or a bankruptcy trustee, should the debtor fail.
As a general matter, the function of the financing statement (formally known 
as a “UCC-1”5) has not been in dispute.6  At least nominally, the UCC-1 “put[s] a 
1
 James J. White, Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Ignorance and New Filing Rules, 
79 MINN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1995).  
2
 John deJ. Pemberton, Jr. Notice Filing for Accounts Receivable, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 
643, 652 & 664 (1948) (citation omitted).
3
 Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 679, 705 (1995).
4
 U.C.C. § 9-401(2000).
5
 A form of financing statement as envisioned by U.C.C. § 9-521 is attached as Annex A. 
6
 As discussed in part III, the larger informational system of which the financing statement is a 
part has been the subject of some controversy.  Indeed, an entire symposium issue of the 
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person on notice of the existence of a security interest in a particular type of 
property so that further inquiry can be made . . . .”7  The financing statement has 
thus been viewed as a potent antidote to the problem of secret liens, the ancient 
conflict that arises whenever one party asserts an interest in property that is 
neither recorded nor otherwise readily observable.8  Secret liens are universally 
castigated.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed long 
ago, “[s]ecret liens have always been repugnant to the law.”9 Karl Lewellyn more 
colorfully equated the secret lien with “that rat in Denmark”10
Minnesota Law Review was devoted to the question.  See "Managing the Paper Trail": 
Evaluating and Reforming the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1995).
7
 Heights v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 463 Pa. 48, 342 A.2d 738, 743 (1975) (emphasis in original).  
"The purpose of a notice-filing statute is to give protection to a creditor by furnishing to others 
intending to enter a transaction with the debtor a starting point for investigation which will result 
in fair warning concerning the transaction contemplated."  TMMB Funding Corp. v. Associated 
Food Stores, Inc., 136 A.D.2d 540, 542, 523 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (2d Dept.1988).  See also Marine 
Drilling Co. v. Hobbs Trailers, 697 S.W. 2d 831 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Waterfield v. Burnett (In re 
Burnett), 21 Bankr. 752 (Bankr. N.M. 1982); Abney v. I.T.T. Diversified Credit Corp., 11 Bankr. 
965 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
8See, e.g., Nunnemaker Transp. Co. v. United Calif. Bank, 456 F.2d 28, 36 (9th Cir. 1972) 
((suggesting in dicta that there is “no risk of a secret lien” where there has been “compliance with 
the notice filing provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code”)(citations omitted); Admor’s Office 
World, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. (In re Admor’s Office World, Inc.), 1992 WL 350577, *2
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The Code seeks to protect against the secret lien and at the same time to 
promote notice filing”)(citing Matter of Pasco Sales Co., Inc., 52 A.D.2d 138, 143, 383 N.Y.S.2d 
42 (2d Dept.1974); Beneficial Finance Co. v. Kurland Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., 32 A.D.2d 643, 
645, 300 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (2d Dept.1969)); United States v. Birco Mining Co., Inc. (In re Birco 
Mining, Inc.), 10 B.R. 545, 548 (Bankr. N.D. Ala 1981) (“The law decries a "secret lien," Corn 
Exchange Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 63 S.Ct. 679, 87 L.Ed. 884, and notice filing is now an 
accepted part of commercial law”).
As Professor Alces explained –
The filing system [] prevents pure debtor fraud -- the kind that the debtor commits without the 
help of a collusive creditor by granting successive collateral interests in the same property 
without notifying each secured party of the (prior) adverse claimants.  This is the true secret 
lien problem and, for some, it is the raison d'etre of the filing system.  If the filing system did 
not provide an effective means to avoid the risk of pure debtor fraud, there might not be any 
remaining viable argument in favor of the filing system.  So if there is to be a filing system, it 
must reduce, if not eliminate entirely, this fraud risk. 
See Alces, supra note 3, at 703.
9
 Holt v. Albert Pick & Co., 25 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir. 1928) (“[n]o citation of authority is 
requisite to support the proposition that [] a secret lien could not avail against an attachment or 
execution creditor, not chargeable with knowledge or notice of its existence. . . . .”).  See also In re 
Reliance Equities, Inc., 966 F.2d 1338 (“’[T]he Bankruptcy Act abhor[s] secret liens....") (citation 
omitted).  In re Brownsville Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 463, 464 (3rd Cir. 1941) (characterizing 
Pennsylvania as a State whose 'abhorrence of the secret lien' did not even admit of the palliative of 
recording.”) (quoting Martin v. Mathiot, 14 Serg []); Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Williams,  
37 F.2d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1930) (“Secret liens are repugnant to the law”); In re Nolan Motor Co., 
25 F.Supp.186, 189 (D.D.C 1938) (“The giving of a secret lien and the attempt to enforce such a 
lien against the claims of creditors represented by the trustee in bankruptcy is repugnant not only 
to the spirit but to the letter of the Bankruptcy Act.”); In re Collins Hosiery Mills, 19 F.Supp. 500, 
502 (E.D.Pa. 1937) (“. . . the common law of Pennsylvania [] abhors a secret lien”); In re Stein, 17 
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Yet, despite the chest-thumping, two recent sets of legislative development 
suggest that we may care much less about the problem of secret liens than we 
might acknowledge.  First, Article 9 of the U.C.C. -- which governs many 
commercial finance transactions, and which was revised effective 200111 --
appears increasingly tolerant of secret liens.  For a variety of reasons (some 
intended, some perhaps not), secured transactions involving such increasingly 
important assets as data, intellectual property, bank accounts, and securities will 
in many cases be undiscoverable from the public record.
Second, and perhaps more controversially, several states have recently 
enacted non-uniform legislation designed to promote asset securitizations.12  At 
least in theory, a securitization differs from a traditional loan because the “debtor” 
in the securitization “sells” property, rather than encumbers it.  Sometimes called 
“structured financings,” transactions with these general contours were apparently 
central to much of Enron’s activities.13   The drive to enact facilitation statutes 
stems in large part from a concern that courts may second-guess the contracted-
F.Supp. 587, 591 (E.D.Pa. 1936) (“[] the law abhors secret liens and the like.”); In re J.F. Grandy 
& Son,146 F. 318, 323 (D.S.C. 1906)(a “secret lien would be abhorrent to equity . . . .”); In re 
Noack, 44 B.R. 172, (Bankr.E.D.Wis. 1984) (“In the final analysis, the facts of each particular 
case shall govern, always bearing in mind the Uniform Commercial Code's abhorrence of secret 
liens.”)(citing J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE, §  22-3 at 883 (2d ed. 1980)); In re Loop Hosp. Partnership, 35 B.R. 929, 936 
(Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1983) (“The UCC has an "abhorrence of secret liens.") (citing WHITE AND 
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UCC, Section 22-3 at 883 (2d Ed.1980)). For a 
general discussion of secret liens, see Julian B. McDonnell in 1 Peter F. Coogan et al., SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ¶¶ 1.01-1.06 (1999).  
10 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 730 (1939).
11
 Revised Article 9 has been enacted in all states, and in most went into effect July 1, 2001. See
NCCUSL—Introductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts, at http://www.nccusl.org/ 
nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca9.asp.  I occasionally denote revised Article 9 
“Rev. § 9-[xxx];” and former Article 9 “F. § 9-[xxx].”
12 See, e.g. 73 DEL. LAWS 214; 2001 Del. ALS 214; 2001 Del. HB 348; codified in Title 6, 
Chapter 27A, of the Delaware Code.  Other states that have recently enacted similar statutes 
include Alabama, ALA. CODE 1975 § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (2002); Louisiana, LA. R.S. 10:9-109(e) 
(2002); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9A-102 (2002); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1109.75 (West 2002); & Texas, TX. BUS. & COM. § 9.109(e) (2002).
13
 There has already been some effort to distinguish securitizations from the types of transactions 
in issue in Enron. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose 
Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309. 1314 (2002).  Schwarcz has argued that 
“unlike in Enron, structured transactions [securitizations] typically transfer substantive risk away 
from the company originating, or sponsoring the transaction . . . .”  Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3-4 
[hereinafter, Schwarcz, Complexity].  As discussed in section [], infra, the securitization 
facilitation statutes would insulate these transactions from all other applicable rules, including 
those on notice-filing, even if they had none of the distinctive virtues identified by Professor 
Schwarcz.  See also Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: 
Dead or Dormant?, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101 (2002) (discussing Enron’s use of 
securitization) [hereinafter “Lipson, Enron”].
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for character of the transaction, and treat it not as a sale, but as a financing.14  If 
so, the property purportedly sold would remain available for all of the debtor’s 
other creditors to share if the debtor went into bankruptcy.  
These statutes solve this problem by giving full preemptive power to the 
underlying contracts (e.g., the sales documents).  If they mean what they say, 
these statutes should create an enormous exception to all state-law-based notice-
filing systems, including those contemplated by the UCC.  They effectively end 
the obligation to give notice.  
This article considers how we have come to diminish the role of notice-filing 
in so many instances, and what that might mean.  Section I examines the deeply 
held intuition that property rights turn on public notice obligations as reflected in 
both recent scholarship and long history.  At a theoretical level, property rights 
come with notice obligations.  The recent work of Thomas Merrill and Henry 
Smith, for example, suggests that these obligations appear designed to reduce the 
transaction costs associated with discovering and respecting property rights.15
Historically, notice-filing appears to have developed in part as a response to the 
fragmentation of community that followed in the wake of the industrial 
revolution.  
Section II explains in detail how, despite this intuition, secret liens can arise in 
a variety of common transactions, including those in which increasingly important 
types of assets such as data and intellectual property are involved.  Section II also 
explains how the securitization facilitation statutes work to defeat notice-filing 
regimes.  
Section III of the article explains how we have lost sight of the link between 
property rights and notice-filing obligations in commercial finance transactions.  
In essence, we have been seduced by a series of arguments about the economics 
of commercial finance and notice-filing.16  Economically, the arguments go, 
14
 Securitization has, in Professor Mann’s view, “produced a powerful impetus for legislation 
ensuring that those transactions receive favorable treatment in bankruptcy.”  Ronald J. Mann, The 
Rise of State Bankruptcy-Directed Legislation, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1805, 1816 (2004).
15 See note [], infra.
16
 While Revised Article 9 and the securitization facilitation statutes do not directly cite this body 
of literature, it would appear that the economic challenge to notice-filing has influenced these 
recent developments.  An overarching goal of Revised Article 9 was to promote economic 
efficiency by making secured transactions easier (and theoretically cheaper) to engage in. The 
Reporters for the committee that drafted Revised Article 9 explained it thus:  
 [M]any . . .  provisions of Revised Article 9 reflect the Drafting Committee's effort to achieve 
more than merely "better," more "efficient," "equitable," or "reasonable" rules to govern 
secured transactions. An overarching goal of the revisions was to provide in the transactional 
context enhanced certainty and predictability from the inception of transactions. This certainty 
can facilitate transactions even though an understandable rule with predictable consequences 
may be normatively suboptimal.
See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of U.C.C. 
Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1357, 1363 (1999).  See also Harry 
Sigman, Twenty Questions About Filing under Revised Article 9: The Rules of the Game Under 
New Part 5, 74 CHI-KENT. L.. REV. 861 (1999) (Revised Article Nine's provisions are intended to 
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notice-filing regimes impose direct and indirect costs of compliance that fail to 
produce corresponding informational benefits.  Unfortunately, the economic 
arguments are incomplete and lack empirical support. 
Part IV suggests that there are other ways to understand the role of notice-
filing.  These understandings are rooted in the ways that information functions in 
commercial communities and the behavioral consequences of notice-filing 
systems.  These other views of notice-filing suggest that we should think carefully 
before doing away with it. 
I. Property, Notice and Commercial Finance Law
A strong intuition in our law links property rights to public notice obligations.  
This intuition enjoys both theoretical currency and an ancient lineage.  Strong 
claims about this intuition have been made by, among others Richard Epstein,17
Carol Rose,18 Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson.19  Most recently, Thomas 
Merrill and Henry Smith have elaborated on this intuition in what may be 
characterized as a neoclassical approach to property law theory.20  They argue that 
property rights are unique because they create “universal duties” that “are 
broadcast to the world from the [property] itself.”21  Historically, linking property 
"make new document filing more efficient, transparent, and uniform.").  See also Patrick A. 
Murphy, Revised Article 9 in Bankruptcy Cases, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE COMMERCIAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI ORDER NUMBER A0-00HP (Sept. 2003) (“The 
purpose of Revised Article 9 is to simplify commercial transactions and, in the process, to make 
them more efficient and less likely to be upset in bankruptcy cases.”).
17 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1355-56 (1982).
18 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 78-79 
(1985).
19 See, e.g., Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of 
Property 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 292  [hereinafter, Baird and Jackson, Uncertainty]; Douglas G. Baird 
& Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 175 (1983) (hereinafter, Baird and Jackson, Scope]; Douglas G. Baird, Notice 
Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J.L.STUDIES 53 (1983) [hereinafter, Baird, 
Ostensible Ownership].
20 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, 
Optimal Property]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 833–42 (2001) [hereinafter, Merrill & Smith, Interface]; Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 
(2001)[hereinafter, Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics].  Henry Smith has elaborated on some of their 
work in Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property:  Form, Context and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1105 (2003).  A recent article critical of certain aspects of the Merrill and Smith approach – especially as 
it pertains to verification – appears in Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, 
and Verification:  The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 373 (2002).  As discussed below, Hansmann and Kraakman nevertheless claim that there 
exists a strong link between notice and property rights, a claim which current trends would appear 
to undermine.
21
 Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 20.
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rights to notice goes back at least as far the Greeks, for whom the “horos” gave 
posted notice of an interest in real property.22
This section summarizes the development of the intuitive link between 
property rights and notice obligations, especially as expressed in commercial 
finance law. “[O]ne of the most firmly rooted doctrines of the common law,”
Grant Gilmore has observed, was “the protection of creditors against undisclosed 
interests in property.”23  This link is the foundation of our abhorrence of secret 
liens.  Satisfying the link between notice and property axiomatically neutralizes 
the problem of secret liens.  Thus, if we can understand where the relationship 
between property and notice comes from, and why it persists (at least in theory), 
we should have some background sense of the problems created by secret liens. 
A. Neoclassical Property Theory and Information Costs
The link between property rights and notice obligations is enjoying something 
of a renaissance among property theoreticians, especially in the work of 
Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith.24  The heart of this neoclassical 
22 As Benito Arrunada explains –
[H]oroi contained the essential data of the encumbrance (always, the nature of the horos as 
security, and more often, but not always, the existence of a written agreement, the name of the 
creditor, and the amount of the debt) and, in some cases, the name of the person who kept the 
document of the transaction, supposedly to make it possible for third parties to collect more 
information. This system was one of the first to make an hypotheca possible--namely the use 
of land as collateral without temporarily transferring ownership or possession to the lender.
Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. ECON & ORG. 401 (2003).
23
 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965), § 3.2, at 67. & ,§ 8.7, 
at 274 (“In the history of our security law there has been one constant factor:  whenever a common 
law device has been covered by a statute, some form of public recordation or filing has been 
required as a condition of perfection of the security interest.'”).  Gilmore was a principal drafter of 
the U.C.C.  As Peter Coogan, another prominent participant in the development of the U.C.C, 
explained:
A history of chattel security could well be written in terms of the 400-year struggle by debtors 
and their secured creditors to create security interests of various sorts in the debtors’ property 
without affording notice to buyers or other creditors, and the attendant demands by unsecured
creditors generally for some kind of notice when all or part of the debtors’ assets become 
subject to security interests.  The parties favoring secrecy have, for the most part, been the 
losers.
Peter F. Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel 
Security Laws, Including “Notice Filing,” 47 IOWA L. REV., 289, 294, n. 8 (1962).
24 See citations in note 20, supra.  It should be noted that Merrill and Smith are not the first to make 
many of these claims.  They also find voice in the work of Jeanne Schroeder and J.E. Penner.  See, 
e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 23-31 (1997); J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of 
Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 713 n.8 (1996); JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE 
VESTAL AND THE FASCES: PSYCHOANALYTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
FEMININE AND PROPERTY (1996); Schroeder, Surrealism supra note []; Schroeder, Death and 
Transfiguration, supra note []; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique 
of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1994); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Vestal 
and the Fasces: Property and the Feminine in Law and Psychoanalysis, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 805 
(1995); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's Imagery of Personal Property as 
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position is that property differs from other common law rights at tort or contract 
because property deals with a limited set of in rem rights that are good against 
“the world.”  Although there are traces of this approach to property in the work of 
Richard Epstein and Carol Rose25, Merrill and Smith take the argument a step 
further, and find a deeper link between notice and property rights.  They argue 
that a unique feature of property is that property creates “universal duties” that 
“are broadcast to the world from the [property] itself.”26  Only if something is 
“marked in the conventional manner as being owned,” they write, will “we know 
that we are subject to certain negative duties of abstention with respect to that 
thing.” 27  Because the thing has been “marked” “we know all this without having 
any idea who the owner of the thing actually is.”28 Even those who criticize 
neoclassical conclusions about the character and development of property rights 
nevertheless agree that “third-party information costs are central to the law’s 
regulation of property rights.”29
1. The Numerus Clausus
Neoclassical views about the notice-function of property are rooted in the 
“numerus clausus,” the idea that property rights come in a fixed and closed 
number of forms.  “Property law,” Merrill and Smith argue, “requires that the 
parties adopt one of a limited number of standard forms that define the legal 
dimensions of their relationship; generally speaking, these are mandatory rules 
that may not be modified by mutual agreement.”30  The number (numerus) of 
property forms is, in the vernacular, closed (clausus) because “common-law 
courts will not enforce an agreement to create a new type of property right.”31
The numerus clausus appears to be a well-articulated feature of many civil law 
jurisdictions.32  In the common law, however, its role is more opaque.  Although 
courts and lawyers are characterized as hostile to the numerus clausus, Merrill and 
Smith nevertheless contend that they “routinely abide by the principle, even if 
they are unaware of its existence.”33  For example, as to estates in land, “courts 
enforce the numerus clausus principle strictly. . . . The menu of forms is regarded 
the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55 (1994).  More recent additions include Adam 
Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003).
25 See supra notes [] & [].
26 See Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 20.
27 See id.
28
 Id.
29 See Hansmann & Kraakman, Property, supra note 20, at 374.
30 See Merrill and Smith, Interface, supra note 20, at 776.
31 See Merrill and Smith, Optimal Property, supra note 20, at 5.  
32 See id. at 4-5 (in civil law countries the numerus clausus is “widely acknowledged by 
commentators as being a substantive limitation on the definition of property”).
33 See id., at 8.  See also id at 6 (“Scholars and judges tend to react to manifestations of the 
numerus clausus as if it were nothing more than outmoded formalism.”).
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as complete and not subject to additions.”34  With respect to personal property, 
Merrill and Smith claim, the list is even narrower.35  The chief exception, they 
argue – the one area in which courts will respect novel claims of property rights –
is in the intellectual property arena.  Here, “judicial creativity in fashioning new 
intellectual-property interests has been sanctioned” in the recognition of rights of 
publicity and on the misappropriation of information.36
The principal explanation for the (sub rosa) vitality of the numerus clausus has 
been economic, oriented around the inefficiency that stems from the excessive 
fragmentation of rights (or rights holders).37  Merrill and Smith take the economic 
explanation one step further, arguing that we restrict property forms not out of 
concerns about fragmentation, per se, but about information costs associated with 
the creation of excessively idiosyncratic property rights (“fancies”).38  Thus, 
Merrill and Smith believe that the need for the numerus clausus “stems from an 
externality involving measurement costs: Parties who create new property rights 
will not take into account the full magnitude of the measurement costs they 
impose on strangers to the title.”39
The information costs of idiosyncratic property forms (they use the example 
of a one-hour time-share in a wrist-watch40) thus explain for Merrill and Smith the 
underlying basis of the numerus clausus.  “One way to control the external costs 
of measurement to third parties is through compulsory standardization of property 
rights.”41  The standardization of property forms imposed by the numerus clausus, 
according to Merrill and Smith, 
reduces the costs of measuring the attributes of such rights. Limiting the 
number of basic property forms allows a market participant or a potential 
34 See Merrill and Smith, Optimal Property, supra note [], at 13.
35
 Id. at 17.  (“Personal property is restricted to fewer available forms of ownership than real 
property.”).
36
 Id. at 20. 
37
 Merrill and Smith are concerned chiefly with the fragmentation of rights themselves.  A related 
problem is the fragmentation of rights amongst numerous rights holders.  See, e.g., Michael A. 
Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 79, 87 (2001); Michael A. 
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 621, 633–40 (1998).
38
 Merrill and Smith refer to idiosyncratic property forms as “fancies,” after the opinion in Keppell 
v. Bailey 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1049 (Ch. 1834)(novel forms of property cannot "be devised and 
attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner."). Merrill and Smith, Optimal Property, 
supra note 20, at 26, nn 102-104.
39
 Merrill and Smith, Optimal Property, supra note 20, at 26-27.
40
 Id. at 27. Note that U.C.C. Article 2A would appear to recognize the time-share in the watch as 
a lease.  U.C.C. § 2A-103(j) defines a lease as “a transfer of the right to possession and use of 
goods for a term in return for consideration.”  There is no apparent reason why the “term” of the 
lease couldn’t be every Monday for one year.   It might be fanciful – and inefficient – but it is 
permissible.
41
 Id. at 33.
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violator to limit his or her inquiry to whether the interest does or does not 
have the features of the forms on the menu. Fancies not on the closed list need 
not be considered because they will not be enforced. When it comes to the 
basic legal dimensions of property, limiting the number of forms thus makes 
the determination of their nature less costly. The "good" in question here 
might be considered to be the prevention of error in ascertaining the attributes 
of property rights. Standardization means less measurement is required to 
achieve a given amount of error prevention. Alternatively, one can say that 
standardization increases the productivity of any given level of measurement 
efforts.42
There is, on this view, an “optimal” number of property forms, and this 
number is determined by the information costs associated with excessively 
idiosyncratic forms of property.  On the one hand, costs in error and measurement 
would be lowest, Merrill and Smith observe, in a highly regimented system, 
which recognized only a single, simple form of property (such as the fee simple 
absolute).43  However, frustration costs arising from stymied creativity would be 
quite high.  On the other hand, a system of unfettered customization of property 
forms – pure contract – may have low frustration costs (how can you be frustrated 
if the law recognizes anything you do?) but high costs of verification and 
measurement.  Both the parties that created the fancy, and others who might try to 
discover what it is and what rights are held in it, will expend large sums in 
ascertaining and managing these rights.  The social cost of limitless customization 
of property rights is simply too great.  The optimal level of customization – the 
number and type of fancies permitted by the numerus clausus – is somewhere in 
between, where all classes of information cost are the lowest.
Merrill and Smith’s view of the existence of and rationale for the numerus 
clausus is not without critics.  In a recent article, Henry Hansmann and Reinier 
Kraakman question the neoclassical assertion that the list of property forms is 
closed or that there may be an “optimal” number of types of property forms.44
Rather, they argue that “the law’s limitations on property rights take the form not 
of standardization in a discreet number of well-defined forms, but rather of 
regulation of the types and degree of notice required to establish different types of 
property rights.”45  Non-standard property rights are recognized by the common 
law, they argue, but “are simply governed by highly unaccommodating 
verification rules that place a heavy burden on the holder of the right to provide 
notice to third parties.”46  “The optimal standardization theory makes little sense 
when applied at the category level,” they suggest.47  By this, they seem to mean 
42
 Id at 33-34 (footnotes omitted).
43
 Id, at 39-40. 
44
 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 20. 
45
 Id. at 374.
46
 Id. at 399.
47
 Id. at 401.
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that a highly idiosyncratic form of property right in one category – say, 
intellectual property – should not create meaningful information costs for property 
in another category, such as real estate.48  Even within categories, increasing the 
number and complexity of rights will not necessarily increase costs significantly, 
“assuming the same verification rules are used” for types of rights within the 
given category.49
2. Property as Information
Perhaps the key point about the numerus clauses is informational: The forced 
standardization of property forms creates a kind of short-hand which, in turn, 
reduces information costs. “When we encounter a thing that is marked in the 
conventional manner as being owned,” Merrill and Smith write, “we know that 
we are subject to certain negative duties of abstention with respect to that thing.”
50
  Because the thing has been “marked” “we know all this without having any 
idea who the owner of the thing actually is.”51  Property law creates “universal 
duties” that are “broadcast to the world from the thing itself.”52
Because property rights are, in the neoclassical conception, “good against all 
the world,” property law essentially “presents a massive coordination problem.”53
If the legal system allowed in rem rights to exist in a large variety of forms, 
then dutyholders would have to acquire and process more information 
whenever they encountered something that is protected by an in rem right. If 
in rem rights were freely customizable--in the way in personam contract rights 
are--then the information-cost burden would quickly become intolerable. Each 
dutyholder would either incur great costs in informing herself, or would be 
forced to violate property rights wholesale, defeating the benefits of security, 
investment, and planning that these rights were meant to secure.54
For Merrill and Smith, the numerus clausus is the silent but stealthy force that 
“reduce[s] the widespread information-gathering and processing costs imposed on 
third parties by any system of in rem rights.55  In other words, simplicity (of a 
48
 Id.
49
 Id.  Nor does the numerus clausus account for the creation and destruction of property forms 
over time.  Michael Heller, for example, has observed that property law in Blackstone’s time 
recognized a variety of forms that have since fallen away.  Heller, Boundaries supra note [], at 
1176, n. 62 (“In Blackstone's time, the numerus clausus was much more numerous, populated with 
incorporeal hereditaments such as corodies and advowdsons that no longer exist. . . . .  Over time, 
these forms were pared down to the streamlined list that exists today.”)(citations omitted).
50 See Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 20 at 359.
51
 Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 20, at 359.  “Marking” was at least one of the 
problems encountered by Twyne in his eponymous case.  3 Co. Rep. 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star 
Chamber 1601).  Twyne’s Case is discussed in part I.B []-[], infra.
52
 Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 20, at 359.
53
 Id. at 387.
54
 Id. at 387 (footnote omitted).
55
 Id. at 387.
The End of Notice Page 11 of 74 
 
C:\inetpub\ wwwroot\results\4381-text.native.1091721321.doc; 8/5/2004 11:50 AM
sort) reduces the cost of informing the world that a property interest exists.
Although Hansmann and Kraakman disagree with the neoclassical conclusion 
that the form of property rights is (and economically-speaking) must be limited, 
they whole-heartedly endorse the link that Merrill and Smith make between 
property rights and notice (which they call “verification”).  Indeed, Merrill and 
Smith err, they argue, by suggesting that notice is required to facilitate 
communication among persons who transact in property rights.  Rather, 
Hansmann and Kraakman argue, limitations on the types of property “facilitate 
the verification of ownership of the rights offered for conveyance.”56  Notice and 
property rights are correlated because “[t]he degree of notice required and the 
extent to which the law affirmatively facilitates the giving of notice vary across 
different types of property rights according to the utility of the partitioning and 
the costs of giving notice.”  In other words “[b]ecause the benefits of partial 
property rights are often low and the costs of verifying these rights are generally 
high, property law necessarily takes an unaccommodating approach to all but a 
few basic categories of partial property rights.”57
Neither Merrill and Smith nor Hansmann and Kraakman express a strong 
opinion about how property-information should be disseminated.  Merrill and 
Smith seem to believe, for example, that notice-filing systems generally are cheap 
sources of information about property rights.58  They offer as an example of this 
the Article 9 financing statement system which, they claim, “allowed the 
loosening of the earlier quite strict limits on the types of security interests 
permitted.”59  But they are not insensible to the possibility that there may be other, 
cheaper ways to disseminate comparable information, such as via electronic 
transmission.60
There may be problems with the neoclassical position.  First, it appears 
tautological.  It may be true that property rights are those with low information 
costs.  But how do we know something is property in the first place, if we do not 
have the information?  What, in other words, came first – the property rights or
our knowledge of them?  Second, this model seems most fully explanatory with 
respect to tangible property.  If there is nothing to “mark” – because the res is an 
intangible  – it is not clear how universal knowledge is possible.  The “world” 
knows very little about my bank account, but most would agree that it is my 
property.61 Conversely, many things that have very low information costs –
56
 Id.
57
 Id. at 375.
58 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Property, supra note 20, at 40 (“registers of interests in real 
property, that is, recording acts . . . lower[] the costs of notice . . .”).
59
 Id. at 42 (footnote omitted).  
60
 Id. At 42  (“Notice is arguably easier to furnish (if not to process) when, for example, rights to 
digital content are being transferred, and notice of restrictions and other features of rights 
transferred are technologically not difficult to provide.”).  
61
 I do not, of course, claim that a deposit account creates an interest in specific funds.  I am also 
mindful of the fact that Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995) undermines the 
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archetypal human relationships -- are not property.  Virtually anyone who sees me 
with my daughter will deduce our relationship.  It will be “universally broadcast” 
from our behavior, but no one would say that either of us has a property interest in 
the relationship, or in one another.  
Third, and as developed in the balance of this article, it fails to account for the 
legislative trend toward eliminating notice-filing, which would seem to make 
property rights more difficult and costly to discover.
B. A Short History of Notice in Commercial Finance Law
Yet the core intuition – that property rights create notice obligations – is 
powerful.  Much of the power of the intuition comes from its lineage.  
Historically, information about property was signaled by possession.  This may 
have made sense in a simpler world.  But as societies became more complex and 
disaggregated, community structures could no longer be reliable sources of 
information about a debtor’s property.  As increasingly devious transactions 
occurred in increasingly sophisticated forms, notice-filing became proxy for the 
information (and controls) that community might otherwise have provided.
1. Possession as Notice
Historically, possession was viewed as the basis of property rights,62 and this 
was as true of the security interest (“pledge”) as any other property interest.63  If 
creditor A took possession of debtor B’s flock of sheep to secure B’s debt to A, at 
least in theory, there would be no doubt in the minds of those asserting an interest in 
B’s property about B’s rights in the sheep:  To all appearances, he had none.  And, 
conversely, where B did have possession, it would be reasonable for creditors or 
purchasers to conclude that he did, in fact, have title or some other equally important 
set of rights (e.g. a lien).  Possession was property.  Or, perhaps more accurately, the 
signal sent by possession was said to justify the conclusion that the possessor had a 
“property interest” in the thing possessed.
idea that the deposit account is property when the debtor/depositor is bankruptcy.  There, the 
Court upheld the exercise of an administrative freeze on a deposit account, notwithstanding the 
automatic stay under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code that prohibits most creditor actions.  Id. 
at 21.  But if the deposit account is not “property” of some sort then no security interest in it is 
possible under Article 9 since, by definition, security interests are interests in “personal property 
[which] secures payment or performance of an obligation.”  U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (2003).
62 See Epstein, supra note []; Rose supra note [].  Or, in the immortal words of English play write 
Colley Cibber (1671-1757), “Possession is eleven points in the law.” COLLEY CIBBER, WOMAN'S 
WIT, Act 1.  
63
 “The legal system’s original method of providing [information about ownership] was to give 
primacy to possession.   At common law, a debtor’s possession of personal property assured a 
prospective creditor that the debtor could give him an unencumbered interest in that property.”   
Baird and Jackson, Possession and Ownership, supra note 19, at 180 (footnoted omitted).  
According to Baird and Jackson, this was because “possession has been viewed as the best 
available source of information concerning “ownership” of most types of personal property.”  Id. 
(Citing Twyne’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601) and statute 13 ELIZ., CH. 5 (1570)).  
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Perhaps the most famous articulation of the link between notice and possessory 
property rights appears in Clow v. Woods.64  In Clow, a tanner (Hancock) conveyed 
to creditors Clow and Sharp mortgages on his vats of hides and tanning 
equipment.  The creditors neither took possession of this personal property 
collateral, nor recorded the mortgage.  The debtor’s former business partner (Poe) 
sued for his share of the value of the firm, obtained a judgment, and sent the 
sheriff to execute on the same hides and equipment.  The secured creditors sued 
the sheriff seeking to recover the proceeds of the sale of this property, arguing in 
substance that their mortgage had priority over Poe’s execution lien.  
Unfortunately for the secured creditors, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had no 
desire to enforce their mortgage, since the court viewed it as fraudulent in law, if 
not in fact.65
Clow turned in significant part on the informational problem created by the 
separation of property right from possessory fact.  Judge Gibson reasoned that the 
“secrecy” of the mortgages (security interests) would harm other creditors of the 
debtor, Hancock, because these other creditors would (mistakenly) rely on the 
apparent value of his hides and equipment in deciding to lend to him.66 His 
ownership of this property, ostensibly free and clear of the rights of all others, 
would induce unwitting (perhaps unsophisticated) creditors to extend unsecured 
credit, at their peril:  
[A] creditor ought not to be suffered to secure himself by means that may 
ultimately work an injury to third persons,” Judge Gibson opined . . . .  Where 
possession has been retained without any stipulation in the conveyance, the 
cases have uniformly declared that to be, not only evidence of fraud, but fraud 
per se. Such a case is not inconsistent with the most perfect honesty; yet a 
court will not stop to inquire, whether there be actual fraud or not; the law will 
impute it, at all events, because it would be dangerous to the public to 
countenance such a transaction under any circumstances. The parties will not 
be suffered to unravel it, and show, that what seemed fraudulent, was not in 
fact so. Would it be less against sound policy to suffer a vendor to remain in 
possession, under an agreement to that effect expressed in the conveyance, and 
thus to create a secret [e]ncumbrance on his personal property, when to the 
world he appears to be the absolute owner, and gains credit as such.67
Clow thus articulated what came to be known as the problem of ostensible 
ownership – the making of credit (or other investment) decisions in reliance on 
the (misleading) appearance that a debtor has rights in property by virtue of 
physical possession.  
64
 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819).
65
 Id. at 283, 288. The court held that the mortgage transaction was a per se fraud against creditors 
and was void under the statute of 13 Elizabeth.
66 Clow id at *4 (The contract between the debtor and creditors was a “secret matter[] between the 
parties themselves, and can afford no notice to creditors.”).
67 Clow at *5 (Gibson, J.).
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Some have questioned whether ostensible ownership creates much of a 
problem.68  Professor Mooney, for example, has argued that creditors (or others) 
are unlikely to rely (reasonably or otherwise) on the mere fact that a debtor 
possessed certain assets when making a credit or other investment decision.69
Mooney’s argument centered principally on proposals to extend notice-filing rules 
to personal property leasing transactions.70  Mooney successfully argued that 
notice-filing would add nothing to such transactions because sophisticated 
creditors either already knew that the debtor leased its property, or did not care 
one way or the other.71  Because ostensible ownership problems by definition 
involved misplaced reliance on a debtor’s property, and creditors rarely relied in 
“unreasonable” ways, Mooney concluded that “[p]erhaps there is no real 'problem' 
at all.”72
While possession technically remains a viable method of creating and 
enforcing property interests in commercial finance transactions,73 it would appear 
68
 See Charles Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9 
Filing: A Critique of Proposals To Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 683, 
725-38 & n 160 (1988) (critiquing claim that possession creates an “ostensible ownership” 
problem).
69
 Mooney, id. at 740 (“Although hard empirical data remains elusive, a review of Code cases 
dealing with priority disputes between lessors and third parties supports the argument that 
mistaken and detrimental reliance on lessees' possession of equipment is not 
commonplace.”)(footnote omitted).
70 See generally Amy Boss, The History of Article 2A:  A Lesson for Practitioner and Scholar 
Alike, 39 ALA. L. REV.  575 (1988).
71
 Mooney, supra note 68, at 785-88.
72
 Id. I note that personal property leasing cases sometimes have important implications for notice-
filing.  The so-called recharacterization cases hold generally that a lease that was, in substance, a 
secured financing may be recharacterized as such and, if the lessor (read: secured party) failed to 
give adequate notice, it would lose its priority to a bankruptcy trustee). See, e.g., Duke Energy 
Royal, LLC v. Pillowtex Corp. (In re Pillowtex, Inc.), 349 F.3d 711 (3d Cir. 2003)(setting forth 
criteria for determining whether transaction is a “true lease” or “disguised financing.”); PCH 
Assocs., 949 F.2d at 595-97 (citing PCH Assocs. v. Liona Corp., 55 B.R. 273 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1985); In re Independence Village, Inc., 52 B.R. 715 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985).  U.C.C. § 9-505 
now explicitly contemplates (and permits) the filing of precautionary financing statements.  In at 
least some states, that might be a good idea, as a sale-leaseback that is not recorded may be treated 
as a fraudulent transfer.  California Civil Code § 3440, for example, makes a sale-leaseback void 
as against creditors of the transferor unless a UCC financing statement is filed in the office of the 
California Secretary of State prior to the sale of the equipment and a notice of the intended transfer 
is published not less than 10 days before the transfer.
73
 U.C.C. § 9-313(c) provides that a secured party may take and perfect a possessory security 
interest in certain types of collateral in the physical possession of some third party (i.e., not the 
debtor) so long as the third party has agreed that it holds the collateral for the benefit of the 
secured party.  See U.C.C. § 9-313(c).  Possessory security interests are not only permitted with 
respect to most tangible collateral, but are actually required to perfect a security interest in money 
(i.e., currency).  U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(3). The possessory security interest is presumed to perform the 
informational functions one might ordinarily associate with notice-filing, since it is an exception 
to the general rule that a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest.  U.C.C. § 
9-310(b) (6).  It is also considered a proxy for the contract that creates a security interest, a written 
(or electronic) security agreement.  U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(B) & (C).This is somewhat surprising, 
The End of Notice Page 15 of 74 
 
C:\inetpub\ wwwroot\results\4381-text.native.1091721321.doc; 8/5/2004 11:50 AM
that Mooney is at least half right, since it is simply not clear what possession 
“means.”74  As any first-year law student can tell you, possession is a highly elusive 
concept.  We do not “possess” most of the things that we claim to possess in ordinary 
language.  Professor Schroeder has elaborated on this point, noting that the 
enormous number of potential, complex property relationships, coupled with the 
development of fictitious legal entities such as corporations (which may have and 
convey interests in property) make physical custody an extremely poor signal of 
any information about either the property itself, or its “ostensible” owner.75
The ambiguity of possession also infects the creditor’s side of things.   For 
example, even if a lender has actual physical possession, we still do not know what to 
make of other creditors of this (the possessory) creditor.  After all, it is entirely 
conceivable that A (B’s creditor) may take possession of B’s property to secure B’s 
obligation.  But it is at least theoretically possible that A may have its own creditors, or 
purchasers, or what have you (C).76  Why should C be any less gullible than B’s 
creditors?  Doesn’t A’s possession (of B’s property) signal to A’s secondary 
stakeholders (such as C) the very same thing that B’s possession would signal to B’s 
creditors, etc?77  How would A’s creditor (C) verify the absence of B’s equity (if 
any) in the collateral?
given that the U.C.C. provides no guidance about what “possession” might mean for these 
purposes.  The U.C.C. “does not define ‘possession.’”  U.C.C. § 9-313 cmt 3.  The U.C.C. “adopts 
the general concept [of possession] as it developed under former Article 9.” Id.  While former 
Article 9, § 9-305, certainly contemplated the creation and perfection of security interests by 
secured party possession, it also said little about what possession might have meant in this context.  
See  U.C.C. § 9-305(2000).
74
 It is this uncertainty that led Professor Phillips to observe that “business people look to written, 
not possessory evidence of ownership. And this view leads generally to recognizing filing, but not 
possession, as a means of notice.”   David M. Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to 
Filing Under Article 9--Part I, 59 B.U.L.REV. 1, 35 (1979).   
75 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. MARY L. REV. 455, 
486-87 (1996) [hereinafter Schroeder, Realism] (“Regardless of what has been historically 
assumed, contemporary property practices suggest that, today, physical custody provides very, 
very little (if any) information about ownership.”). See also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and 
Transfiguration:  The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed “Property,” 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1281 (1996) 
[hereinafter Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration]. Professor Schroeder thus argues with some force 
that possession in commercial law is at best a metaphor for what she calls “sensuous grasping.”  
Schroeder, Surrealism, supra note [], at 455. Yet, as Schroeder observes, it is a metaphor that fails to 
serve commercial law well.  It is simply not meaningful to view transactions in intangible property –
which is increasingly where the real value is -- as  like a physical conveyance, a simple “farmer’s 
transaction.”  Schroeder, Surrealism, supra note [], at 492 (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales 
on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 732 (1939)). For example, investment property (e.g., stocks 
and bonds) often exists in complex networks of computers which are owned (and perhaps “possessed”) 
by firms, which are then linked in complex, pyramidal broker-dealer relationships.  See Prefatory Note, 
U.C.C Art. 8 (1994) (discussing evolution of securities holding systems).
76 See Baird and Jackson, Uncertainty, supra note 19, at 307.
77
 Baird and Jackson dismiss this problem of “repledge” as being “largely a theoretical one.”  Id. at 
307.  Presumably they were at the time unaware of the basic functioning of the securities markets.  
Professor Kettering has thoughtfully demonstrated that this problem is not merely theoretical in 
the context of securities transactions, especially by and among broker-dealers.  See Kenneth C. 
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Yet, assertions about what the law should be based on assumptions about how 
people process information turn out to be very difficult to sustain.  It seems fairly clear 
that in smaller and more tightly knit communities, possession may well have been an 
effective signal.  Otherwise, it seems unlikely that possession could ever have been an 
acceptable means of distributing property rights.  If so, Clow is ultimately wrong in 
result, even if it may be correct in its policy concerns.  If, as seems likely, Hancock’s 
creditors – and in particular, Poe, the creditor and former business partner -- knew or 
had reason to know that Clow and Sharp had a mortgage on Hancock’s property, what 
value would notice-filing (or creditor possession) have added?  How did Poe (or 
anyone else) rely unreasonably on Hancock’s (the debtor’s) possession?
Possession undoubtedly sends an ambiguous signal, but that is only half the story.  
As discussed in Part IV.B below, we are just beginning to develop theories about how 
human beings process information and form judgments in the presence of ambiguity. 
In any case, it would appear that information has complex affects on both the audience 
for, and the providers of, information about property, none of which have been fully 
accounted for by those who dismiss the problem of ostensible ownership.
Perhaps the ultimate problem with the possessory security interest has only 
indirectly involved information.  This is the practical problem arising from the 
fact that, as the economy grew in depth, breadth and complexity, possessory 
security interests became neither useful nor appealing to those engaged in increasingly 
sophisticated mercantile transactions.78  If true to form, the debtor could not possess or 
make use of property held by the secured creditor.  Hancock, the tanner in Clow, 
would not have been able to produce the leather goods that were presumably his stock 
in trade and the sale of which would make it possible for him to repay the loan.  If not 
true to form, there remained the distinct possibility of ex post judicial nullification.  
For manufacturers, this meant that their equipment could not secure a loan; for 
merchants, the same prohibition limited the value of their inventory.  Nor could future 
interests secure present loans.  Nor could intangible rights serve as collateral.  And so 
on.  Possession thus became a speed-bump on the road to increasingly complex, 
disaggregated property rights.  Increasingly dynamic uses of property would render 
possession vestigial at best, and misleading  at worst.79
2. Notice Systems 
Given these problems with the possessory security interest, it is not surprising that 
pressure developed to find an alternative.  The alternative was notice filing.80  Linking 
the right to enforce a nonpossessory interest in property (e.g., a security interest) to 
Kettering, Repledge and Pre-Default Sale of Securities Collateral Under Revised Article 9, 61 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 45 (1999).
78
 Baird and Jackson, Uncertainty, supra note 19, at 308.
79 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM, 9-10 (1956) 
(“[P]revailing nineteenth century attitudes in fact made private property pre-eminently a dynamic, 
not a static institution.”).
80
 At least originally, however, it was not considered to be a particularly good one.  Professor 
Gilmore observed that “[o]riginally filing was looked as merely an alternative, a less desirable 
alternative, to possession taken by the secured party.”  Gilmore, supra note [], at § 15.1, p. 462
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publicly filed notice of that interest has had a long and complex career.  While notice-
filing may have served a number of purposes over time, one undoubtedly 
involved preserving the link between property rights and notice-obligations.  
Since notice-filing systems exploded with the disaggregation of community 
during the industrial revolution, it may also be that notice-filing developed as a 
proxy for the information that community would once have provided to creditors. 
(a) The Roots of Notice-Filing – Recordation, Fraudulent Conveyance and 
Sign-posting 
Separating property from information about it – conveying property 
information in some way other than possession – well precedes the modern 
notice-filing systems we have today.  Indeed, even while Clow might have 
counseled that possession was the only (or principal) method of creating an 
effective security interest in personal property, real property rights were being 
reified in recordation systems that would be the forerunner for the notice-filing 
systems that became ubiquitous in the 19th century.  
In England, for example, recordation systems developed with respect to real 
property, and were used as a matter of choice81 or custom.82  In colonial North 
America, real property recording systems performed several different functions.  
Certain communities in Massachusetts, for example, may have used recording and 
acknowledgment rules to limit the admission of new members of the community 
or to control improvements to property.83  More frequently, it appears that 
81See John Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 617, 620 (1931) 
(“Prior to the Norman conquest there seems to have been a system of voluntary registration of land 
deeds in monasteries”). Even where not voluntary, Professor Bowers reports that they may have 
been easily circumvented.  See James W. Bowers, Of Bureaucrats' Brothers-in-Law and 
Bankruptcy Taxes:  Article 9 Filing Systems and the Market for Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 
721, 722-23 (1995).  The 1535 English Statute of Enrollments, which required recordation of a 
“bargain and conveyance” of real property, was in fact a disguised taxation device. (citing 27 Hen. 
8, ch. 16 (Eng.)). It was, in his view, one which often failed because lawyer simply paper around 
the transaction. Bowers, supra at 731.  See also Hanna, supra  note [], at 619 (discussing Statute of 
Enrollments).
82
 In a 1907 issue of Green Bag, Joseph H. Beale, Jr. suggests that borough custom in England 
required the registry of deeds to real property, and might have influenced the settlers in 
Massachusetts and Virginia.  See Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Origin of the System of Recording 
Deeds in America, 19 GREEN BAG 335, 338 (1907).  The custom of London, for example, was said 
to be as follows:
The persons that sealed the deed must go before the Lord Mayor, or the Recorder and one 
Alderman, and make acknowledgement that the same is their act and deed; if a wife be a 
party, she is to be examined by them, whether it was done with her full and free consent, 
without any kind of compulsion; in testimony of which the Lord Mayor or the Recorder and 
Alderman set their hands to it, for which each may demand 4d, and the attorney’s fee for the 
judgment is 2d.  Afterwards the deed must be delivered to the clerk of the Inrolments who at 
the next Hustings will cause the proclamation to be made thereof according to the customs of 
the court.
Beale, supra, at 338 (quoting Bohun, Privilegia Londini, 241).  
83
 Id. At 336-37 (citing CAMBRIDGE TOWN RECORDS, vol. ii. Pp. 4, 10; BOSTON RECORD
COMMISSIONER’S REPORTS,  vol. iv., p. 8 & vol. ii, p. 5).
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recordation was viewed as a way to address the problem of fraudulent conveyance 
– a conveyance intended to place property out of the reach of creditors.84  For 
example, in 1640, both Jamestown85 and the Massachusetts court86 enacted rules 
providing that a nonpossessory interest in real property (title or mortgage) would 
be treated as fraudulent unless publicly recorded.87
The problem of fraudulent conveyance appears to have had a significant 
influence on the development of notice-filing rules, and provides some insight 
into the historic role that community might play in all of this.  Perhaps the classic 
case of fraudulent conveyance was Twyne’s Case.88  There, one Pierce was 
indebted to Twyne and to another creditor.  “In secret,” however, Pierce conveyed 
all of his property to Twyne in satisfaction of the debt.  Despite the conveyance, 
Pierce nevertheless continued to act as if the property remained his, including by 
marking and selling his sheep as if they were his, and not Twyne’s.89  In avoiding 
84
 Beale, supra note [], at 335 (citing Hening’s Statutes, vol. I, p. 227).  See also Mark DeWolfe 
Howe, The Recording of Deeds in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 29 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1948). 
85
 Id.  
86
 Id. at 337.  The Massachusetts rule provided as follows:
For avoyding all fraudulent conveyences, & that every man may know what estate or interest 
other men may have in any houses, lands or other hereditamants they are to deale in, it is 
therefore ordered, that after the end of this month no morgage, bargaine, sale, or graunt 
hereafter to bee made of any houses, lands, rents, or other hereditamants shalbee of force 
against any other person except the graunter & his heires, unless the same bee recorded, as is 
hereafter expressed.”  
I Records of Massachusetts 116. 
Perhaps foreshadowing the streamlined notice requirements of the UCC, the ordinance further 
provided that “it is not intended that the whole bargaine, sale, &c. shalbee entered, but onely the 
names of the graunter & grauntee, the thing & the estate graunted & the date; and all such entryes 
shalbee certified to the recorder at Boston.”  Id.  As discussed below, the modern UCC-1 financing 
statement requires only a cursory recitation of the debtor (grantor), secured party (grantee) and 
brief description of the collateral.  U.C.C § 9-503(a). Hanna also suggests that colonial law 
embraced recordation as a response to the problem of fraudulent conveyance.  See Hanna, supra
note [], at 620 (“”England has influenced American law makers in the drafting of recording 
statutes …. as a result of the statutes of fraudulent conveyance and reputed ownership.”) (citing 13 
Eliz.. c. 5) 
87
 Professor Howe uncovered certain amendments to Massachusetts’ statute suggesting that 
recording was required only where a grantor (i.e., debtor) retained possession following a 
conveyance.   See Howe, supra note [], at 4 (“the provision in the Code of 1648 makes it 
abundantly clear that recording would thereafter be required only if the grantor remained in 
possession.”). This suggests that, contrary to Beale’s view, discussed in note [] supra, the 
Massachusetts system provided only a limited model from which the current system might have 
developed.  
88
 3 Co. Rep. 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).  The Star Chamber was enforcing the 
Statute of 13 Elizabeth which provided that transfers with the 'intent [ ] to delay, hinder or defraud 
creditors and others' were void, provided for recovery of the 'whole value of . . . goods and 
chattels' transfered, to be shared by the Crown and aggrieved parties (such as creditors), and 
provided for criminal sanctions against the parties to the transfer.  13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570).
89
   3 Co. Rep. 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 811 (Star Chamber 1601).
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(undoing) the conveyance, the Star Chamber reasoned that “a secret transfer is 
always a badge of fraud.”90
One way to understand fraudulent conveyance was as an affront to community 
norms.  The statute that Twyne’s Case enforced – the Statute 13 Elizabeth c. 5 –
was enacted in part to deal with debtors who would remove themselves and/or 
their property from the community once it became apparent that they could not 
satisfy their debts. 91  As Professor Flint explains –
Overburdened debtors in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries frequently 
transferred all their lands and goods to their friends in trust for use of the 
grantor through fictitious sales, fled to one of the numerous sanctuaries where 
the king's courts' power did not govern, lived luxuriously from the income of 
the property transferred until the creditor accepted payment of a small portion 
of the debt and released the remainder, then returned, and had back their 
property.92
Recordation systems appear to have developed, in part, as an informational 
proxy for possession which could deter or correct the problems of fraudulent 
conveyance and secret liens.  Although these systems existed even before the 
Revolution,93 they began to flourish later, in the early part of the 19th century 
with a view to preventing or remedying problems like those in Twyne’s Case.94
Recording was viewed as a means of deterring the actual or constructive fraud 
90
 Professor Mooney, and others, have argued that Twyne was a case chiefly about fraud and not, 
as Baird and Jackson claim, about ostensible ownership.  See Mooney, supra note 68, at 727 & n. 
166. However that may be, the problem of fraudulent conveyance differs in some respects from 
the problem of secret liens.  At least historically (as in Twyne’s Case) a fraudulent conveyance 
involved a transfer of property after a debt was incurred and not satisfied.  Placing the property out 
of reach of the creditor was the chief evil in such cases.  Secret lien cases, however, often involved 
a transfer of property prior to a debt being incurred.  The problem of fraudulent conveyance is thus 
largely ex post, while the problem of secret liens may be ex post or ex ante.  Yet the essential 
informational problem is the same in both.  The actual secrecy of the transaction in Twyne’s Case, 
and the presumptive secrecy of the transaction in Clow, appear to have been as troubling as any ill 
intent in either (to evade creditors).
91
 Professor Mooney maintains that the Statute of Elizabeth was “intended in large part as a 
revenue measure.” Mooney, supra note 68, at 726, n.162 (citing 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §   61b, 61c, at 89-93 (rev. ed. 1940)).
92 See George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History:  The Fraudulent Myth, 29 N.M. L. 
REV. 363, 380 (1999) [hereinafter, Flint, Fraudulent Myth] (citations omitted).
93 See Flint, Fraudulent Myth supra note [], at  363, n. 5.  See also George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured 
Transactions History:  The Impact of Textile Machinery on the Chattel Mortgage Acts of the 
Northeast, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 303 (1999); George Lee Flint, Jr., The Secured Transactions 
History:  The Northern Struggle to Defeat the Judgment Lien in the Chattel Mortgage Era, 20 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 1 (2000)  [hereinafter, Flint, Northern Struggle]. 
94
 See Gilmore, supra note [], at §§ 2.1 & 2.2 (discussing history of chattel mortgage acts as 
response to problems of fraudulent conveyance); compare  Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note [], 
at 367 (“This study importantly eliminates Gilmore's implication of the nonpossessory secured 
transaction as a fraudulent transaction.”).  For purposes of this article, it is not necessary to resolve 
whether nonpossessory secured transactions were or were not fraudulent.  The ultimate questions 
are why public notice systems took hold, and whether they continue to make sense.
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presumed to be at the heart of the non-possessory property interest.  To the extent 
that fraudulent conveyance was a transgression of community norms, therefore, 
the compulsory disclosure of information became a method of regulating that 
which the community could not.
These systems bloomed with the industrial revolution, and its insatiable 
demands for liquidity.  As Professor Gilmore explained:  
The unprecedentedly rapid expansion of industrial facilities created and 
equally unprecedented demand for credit.  The financing institutions which 
were the source of credit naturally desired security for the loans . . . .  As 
industrialization progressed, personal rather than real property came to be the 
principal repository of wealth.  The mortgage on Blackacre would not longer 
be enough to support the merchant’s insatiable demand for credit and the 
banker’s demand for security.  Nor would the medieval institution of pledge 
suffice to take up the slack . . . [industrial] property which could not be 
pledged because it had to be used in the borrower’s business represented a 
nearly inexhaustible source of prime collateral for loans.  The story of how the 
equipment and the rolling stock and the stock in trade came to be available as 
collateral is essentially the story of personal property security law in the 
nineteenth century.95
Yet, while growing industrialization in the 19th century may have sought 
increasingly efficient methods of creating liquidity, it would appear that
commercial finance statutes of that era were anything but simple.  First, the 
recording systems did not, strictly speaking, require notice filing.  Rather, being 
rooted in the real property recordation systems, they usually called for the 
recording of elaborate documentation, including the filing of the mortgage itself 
and sometimes ancillary materials, such as affidavits and acknowledgments of 
good faith and consideration.96  These additional documents were, in Professor 
Gilmore’s estimation, “self-serving,” and reflected “the deep-rooted nineteenth 
century suspicion that a [non-possessory] mortgage on personal property was in 
all probability a species of fraudulent conveyance.”97
Second, because there were several different independent security devices, 
there were several different independent recording systems.98  Because lenders 
frequently had to avail themselves of several different forms of security, they 
would have had to comply with several different filing systems.  While this would 
presumably have increased the incidence of innocent mistakes, it is not clear that 
95 See Gilmore, supra note []. at § 2.1, p. 25.  Of course, Professor Gilmore also observes that the 
same pressures that led to a wide variety of complex alternatives to the pledge were not replicated 
in England, where commercial needs were addressed “in an altogether simpler fashion.”  Id.
96 See, e.g., Coogan, supra note [], at 291; Gilmore, supra note [], at § 15.2, p. 466.
97
 Gilmore, supra note [], at § 15.2, p. 466.
98 See Gilmore, supra note [], at § 15.1, p. 463 (“The typical pre-Code pattern included separate 
filing systems for chattel mortgages, for conditional sales, for trust receipts, for factor’s liens, and 
for assignments of accounts receivable.”).
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it resulted in more or (more importantly) better information on which creditors 
and other investors could rely.
This tendency to confuse quantity of information with quality persisted into 
the early 20th century, reaching an apex of sorts with the enactment of the factors’ 
lien acts.  These acts often required both notice filing and the posting of signs on 
debtors’ doors.  The prototype for this sort of law was the New York Factors’ 
Lien Act,99 enacted after some political skirmishing in 1911.100  As enacted, the 
bill provided that --
Liens upon merchandise or the proceeds thereof created by agreement for the 
purpose of securing the repayment of loans…made upon the security of said 
merchandise …shall not be void or presumed to be fraudulent or void as 
against creditors or otherwise, by reason of want of delivery to or possession 
on the part of the lienor, whether such merchandise shall be in existence at the 
time of the creation of the lien or shall come into existence subsequently 
thereto…provided there shall be placed and maintained in a conspicuous place 
at the entrance of every building…at which such merchandise…shall be 
located…a sign on which is printed…the name of the lienor and…provided 
further that a notice of the lien is filed…101
Duplicative notice – filed and posted – was justified on informational grounds.  
Assemblyman (later Governor) Alfred E. Smith argued in support of the Factors’ 
Lien Act that “[a]ll that the bill does is to substitute public notice for actual 
possession of the goods.”102  Notice – by filing and sign-posting -- was, in Smith’s 
words, “a form of constructive possession of the goods.”103  If one believed that 
99 N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1911, ch. 326, § 1, amended by N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1931, ch. 766, N.Y. SESS. 
LAWS 1935, ch. 690, N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1943, ch. 635, N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1954, ch. 594, as 
amended, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 45.
100
 The Factors’ Lien Act was initially vetoed in the year that it was introduced in New York 
(1910).  See Robert M. Zinman, Dominion and the Factor’s Lien: Does Section 45 of the New 
York Personal Property Law Abrogate the “Dominion Rule”?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 59, 70 
(1961). The history of the initial veto and subsequent modification and enactment of the Factors 
Lien Act is somewhat confused.  Peter Coogan indicates that Hughes vetoed the legislation 
because it lacked a provision requiring sign posting.  Coogan supra note [], at 294, n 8.  Professor 
Zinman and several other authors he cites suggest that the Act originally contained only the sign-
posting requirement, and not the additional requirement of notice-filing. See Zinman supra. The 
weight of authority would appear to be on Professor Zinman’s side. In any case, the important 
point is not the legislative history of the Act, but as discussed throughout this article, the role that 
public notice played in its enactment (or not).  I should note, however, that sign-posting as a 
particular method of rendering security interests enforceable was for a brief period popular with 
state legislatures, and then flamed out.  Problems with sign-posting and the factors’ liens acts in 
general are discussed in a symposium issues of Law and Contemporary Problems.  See 13 LAW 
AND CONTEMP. PROB. [] (1948). 
101
   N.Y. Sess. Laws 1911, ch. 326,  1.
102
 Zinman, supra note [], at 70 (citations omitted)
103
 Zinman, supra note [], at 70.
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possession was a meaningful method of conveying information about property, 
one might then accept the idea that notice-filing was at least as effective.104
Factoring is a good example of how notice-filing became proxy for 
information that a community might otherwise have generated about a debtor’s 
property.  Factoring began as a form of consignment sales transaction:105  remote 
manufacturers (often garment makers) would deliver goods to factors in the cities, 
who would sell the goods and remit proceeds to the manufacturer.106  So long as 
the factor had possession, it appears that the factor also had a lien.107  Problems 
arose for factors, however, when the manufacturers began to retain possession of 
their finished goods in warehouses they owned or leased in the sales markets, 
while factors continued to provide financing, principally by purchasing the 
receivables that would be generated when the merchandise was sold.108  Without 
possession of the goods, the factor would lose its common law lien.  
Because these transactions were not covered by the recording statutes then in 
force, the parties had to develop some way to establish the factor’s nonpossessory 
lien on the manufacturer’s goods in the event the manufacturer went bankrupt.  
The method chosen by the community of factors and merchants was “sign 
posting.”  For example, in Ryttenberg v. Shefer,109 a case that arose before 
enactment of the New York Act, the parties assigned the manufacturer’s 
warehouse lease to the factor, and a sign was posted at the entrance to the storage 
floor, indicating that the premises had been “annexed” to the factor.110  Despite 
expert testimony to the effect that this was the industry’s way of giving public 
notice of a factor’s lien, the court concluded there that the sign was “indecisive” 
104
 It should be noted that not everyone shares this belief.  See, e.g., Phillips, supra note [], at 6 
(“By providing generally for possession either to constitute the exclusive or preferred means of 
perfection or to alternate with filing, Article 9 follows the premise that possession satisfies the 
function of perfection. [Yet] possession both fails to satisfy the equitable basis for the preferential 
effects of perfection and imposes costs....”).
105 See Herbert R. Silverman, Factoring:  Its Legal Aspects and Justifications, 13 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 593 (1948).  Silverman has suggested that, broadly understood, factoring well 
preceded the law of the United States, and was apparently part of Roman commerce.  See 
Silverman, supra at 593.
106 See Silverman, supra note [] at 593.  Factors differed from brokers because the factor was said 
to be entrusted with the merchandise, and would apparently absorb the loss in the event the 
customer ultimately failed to pay.  Id. at 593 (citing Parons on Contract 100 (5th ed. 1905).  
107 See Zinman, supra note [], at 65 (citations omitted).  See also Kruger v. Wilcox, Ambler 252, 
27 Eng. Rep. 168 (Ch. 1755) (holding at common law that factor had a general lien on the goods 
and products of his principal in the factor’s possession).  The common-law possessory lien was 
later enacted by the New York Legislature as N.Y. Sess. Laws 1830, ch. 179.
108
 Zinman, supra note [] at 66-67.
109
 131 Fed. 313 (1904)
110
 131 Fed., at 320.   The sign stated “Shefer, Schramm & Vogel, Annex.” Shefer was the factor.  
Id.
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because the premises did not in substance belong to the factor, and the factor 
could therefore have been barred by injunction from the premises.111
Cases like Ryttenberg called for a legislative response, which came in the 
form of the New York Factors’ Lien Act.  As noted above, New York may have 
been willing to permit factors to retain nonpossessory liens on merchants’ 
inventory, but only if public notice of the interest was given.  Sign posting was 
one way this notice was to be given.  Yet sign-posting was not, by itself, 
apparently sufficient notice of the property interest in question.  As originally 
proposed, the New York act required only sign posting, and not the additional 
step of notice-filing.  For this reason, Charles Evans Hughes, then-governor of 
New York,112 vetoed it in 1910.  Without notice-filing, he said, the Act “’would . . 
. facilitate secret liens and fraudulent transactions.’”113  Once notice filing was 
added, Hughes signed the bill into law.
Sign-posting as required by the Factor’s Lien Act would have a short-shelf life 
as a method of conveying property information in commercial finance 
transactions.  In 1954, New York amended the Factor’s Lien Act to eliminate the 
sign-posting requirement.114  The reasons for eliminating sign-posting would 
sound familiar to us, today.  The proponent of the amendment, Assemblyman 
Stanley Steingut, argued that sign-posting was “completely old-fashioned, in that 
it presupposed that credit grantors make a personal examination of the premises of 
the credit seeker.  As a matter of fact, credit grantors rely upon financial 
statements and upon credit reports issued by . . . credit agencies . . . .”115
This suggests that community norms about the generation of information have 
historically been important in deciding what information should be conveyed, and 
how.  While sign-posting may at one time have conveyed important signals about 
relationships between things and people, it became increasingly clear that the sign 
told the community little of value.  The sign became, in Professor Zinman’s 
words, a “superfluous nuisance.”116  Worse, while it may have provided little 
useful information to the merchant community, it did give information to others 
who may have had no legitimate reason to know about the debtor’s finances, such 
as customers, competitors and employees.  And, of course, there was always the 
possibility that the unscrupulous debtor might remove the sign on the eve of 
bankruptcy, thereby exposing the lender to the risk that it would effectively lose 
its entire property interest.  The sign, like possession before it, impeded the 
development of richer, and more complex, commercial relationships.
111
 Id.
112
 And, from 1930 to 1941, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Vol. 1 1383-84 (3d ed. 2000).
113 See Silverman, supra note [], at 599  (quoting statement of Hughes) (citations omitted).  
114
 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1954, ch. 594.
115
 Zinman, supra note [], at 83, n. 117.
116
 Zinman, supra note [], at 83.
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(b) Notice-filing
While sign-posting may have withered away, notice-filing survived.  Indeed, 
it flourished, and continued to abstract away from the real property recordation 
model which preceded it.  The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, promulgated in 1933, 
“popularized the idea that for certain kinds of transactions,” such as those 
involving inventory or accounts receivable, “it is not essential for all of the details 
of the transaction to be spread upon the public record so long as the record gives 
an indication where an interested party might inquire to learn whether or not 
particular collateral of the indicated class or type is subject to the perfected 
security interest.”117 The drafters of the U.C.C. picked up on this theme.  Until 
recently, notice filing was the dominant means of rendering a nonpossessory security 
interest in personal property enforceable against third parties.
118
  While highly 
important transactions and types of collateral are effectively exempt from notice-filing, 
giving notice remains an important method for perfecting a security interest. 119
Today, if notice is required at all, it will be given in one of two general ways.  If 
some registry already exists with respect to the type of property in question, Article 9 
“steps back” to require that notice of the security interest in that type of property be 
perfected by giving notice in the existing registry.120  But where another registry does 
117
 Coogan, supra note [], at 314-15.  The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, promulgated by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1933, permitted the filing of a 
“statement of trust receipt financing” of the following form:
The entruster,..............................................................whose chief place of business within this 
state is at ............................................................................................, [or who has no place of 
business within this state and whose chief place of business outside this state is 
at.......................................................................................] is or expects to be engaged in 
financing under trust receipt transactions the acquisition by the trustee, 
.................................................................................whose chief place of business within this 
state is at....................................................... of goods of the following description:
[coffee, silk, automobiles, or the like.]
     [Signed] Entruster
     [Signed] Trustee.
U.T.R.A. § 13(2).
This form can be seen as an ur-UCC-1, a simple notice of the pre-UCC equivalent of the non-
possessory security interest.
118
See Gilmore, supra note [], at § 15.1, p. 463 (“As nonpossessory security interests become 
more familiar, filing comes to be looked on not merely as an alternative to possession but as the 
exclusive method of perfection.”).  See also William C. Hillman, What’s in a Name: The U.C.C. 
Filing System in the Courts, 45 OKLA L. REV. 151 (1991)(“the primary method of perfection  
[under former Article 9 was] by the filing of a financing statement/”).  The rules on notice in 
prerevision Article 9 appeared principally in U.C.C. §§ 9-401 – 9-407 (2000).
119
 See U.C.C § 9-310(a).
120 See UCC §§ 9-311(a)(1); 9-310(a). UCC § 9-311 provides that a financing statement is not 
effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to “a statute, regulation, or treaty of the 
United States whose requirements for a security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a 
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not exist – and that may well be true much of the time – the security interest will be 
perfected by filing a UCC-1 financing statement in the state of the debtor’s location.121
The UCC-1 is – as set forth in Annex A -- a simple form (paper or electronic) that sets 
forth the debtor’s name, the secured party’s name, and a brief description of the 
property subject to the security interest.122  The financing statement may also set forth 
certain other items of information about the debtor, including its organizational type
and identification number (if any) and its address.123
The financing statement system may thus be seen as an articulation of the link 
between property rights and notice obligation that arises when other means of 
gathering information about a debtor (e.g., its community) are unavailing.  As Baird 
and Jackson have observed “[notice f]iling systems work because the legal rules 
provide not only a benefit to a person who desires to acquire a property right but 
also a corresponding responsibility.  One is obliged to stake one’s claim in the 
lien creditor with respect to the property,” preempts the general rule contained in section 9-310 
that a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest. 
The Official Comment to U.C.C. § 9-311(a) explains that an example of such a statute is 49 
U.S.C. § 44107, for civil aircraft.  Section 44107 establishes “a system for recording (1) 
conveyances that affect an interest in civil aircraft of the United States” including “leases and 
instruments executed for security purposes, including conditional sales contracts, assignments, and 
amendments.”  49 U.S.C. § 44107(a) (1994).  Section 44108 sets forth a limited rule of priority, 
providing that until recorded under § 44107, a security interest in civil aircraft “is valid only 
against—(1) the person making the conveyance, lease, or instrument;  (2) that person's heirs and 
devisees; and (3) a person having actual notice of the conveyance, lease, or instrument.”  Id. § 
44108. Although “no conveyance or instrument affecting the title to any civil aircraft is valid  
against third parties without notice of the sale until such conveyance or instrument is filed for 
recordation with the F.A.A.,” Air Vt., Inc. v. Beech Acceptance Corp. (In re Air Vt., Inc.), 44 B.R. 
433, 437-38 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984) (citing South Shore Bank v. Tony Mat., Inc., 712 F.2d 896, 897 
(3d Cir. 1983)), Article 9 has nevertheless been used as a gap filler.  See id. at 436-37 (applying 
buyer in ordinary course rules of F. § 9-307 to sale of federally-titled civilian aircraft); see also
Pers. Jet, Inc. v. Callihan, 624 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Former Article 9 to fill void in 
Federal Aviation Act). Other federal statutes that might preempt Article 9’s filing system include 
the Ship Mortgage Act, and federal law governing security interests in rolling stock   49 U.S.C. § 
11301(a) (1994).  See Drabkin v. Cont’l Ill. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Auto- Train Corp.), 9 B.R. 
207 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1981).  
An especially important category of collateral here will be copyright, and perhaps other types 
of intellectual property. See also Jonathan C. Lipson, Remote Control:  Revised Article 9 and the 
Negotiability of Information, 63 OHIO ST. L. J 1327 (2002) [hereinafter, “Lipson Remote 
Control”]; Jonathan Lipson, Financing Information Technologies:  Fairness and Function, 2001 
WIS. L. REV. 1067, 1104-1122 [hereinafter “Lipson, Information Technologies”].  As discussed 
below, the recent decision in World Auxiliary Power provides some clarity about the scope of 
federal law in this context, but may also create other problems.  [CITE AND CROSS 
REFERENCE]
121
 U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-307. 9-310 & 9-501.  Generally speaking, a corporate (or other “registered 
organization) debtor will be “located” in its state of formation (e.g., a Delaware corporation is 
located in Delaware, even if it has no physical presence in that state). See generally Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Article 9 Filing System: Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should be the 
Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REV. 577 (1995). 
122
 U.C.C. §§ 9-503 & 9-521.
123
 U.C.C. § 9-516(b).
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filing system so that future parties will be able to find it.”124
Ironically, it appears that the true force of notice-filing has come not from its 
informational value but from the penalty that would befall the secured creditor whose 
notice was defective.  When a debtor entered bankruptcy, a trustee could exploit these 
errors and avoid transactions in which notice was flawed.  This power, sometimes 
called the “strong-arm power” was needed, Congress indicated, “to prevent the evil
of secret liens.”125  In 1910, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act then in force 
to expand the bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers.126  Congress was concerned 
that cases like York Mfg v. Cassell127 paralyzed bankruptcy trustees trying to 
recapture for the estate property that had been conditionally assigned in 
unrecorded transactions.128  In response to York Congress amended the Bankruptcy 
Act to provide that bankruptcy trustees “shall be deemed vested with all the 
rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable 
proceedings . . . .”129  Congress reasoned that an “unrecorded instrument [of 
conveyance] . . . which would have been void in the state courts had the property 
been . . . levied upon by attachment or execution from a state court” should be 
ineffective (“void”) as against a bankruptcy trustee.130
Eradicating secret liens remains the goal of the strong-arm power.  Thus, the 
1973 Report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, which 
led ultimately to the current Bankruptcy Code, observed that “[o]ne of the 
essential features of any bankruptcy law is the inclusion of provisions designed to 
invalidate secret transfers made by the bankruptcy prior to the date of the filing of 
petition.”131  Although the Bankruptcy Code has been through several major 
revisions since the early part of the 20th century, the strong-arm power remains 
essentially intact, and is today found in section 544(a)(1).132
124
 Baird and Jackson, Uncertainty, supra note 19, at p. 312.
125
 45 Cong. Rec. 2275 (1910).
126 See H.R. Rep. No. 61-511, at 6-7 (1910).
127
 201 U.S. 344 (1906).
128 Id. at 352.   The Court reasoned in York Mfg that because the bankruptcy trustee “stands simply 
in the shoes of the bankrupt . . . he has no greater right than the bankrupt.”  Id.  Having no greater 
rights in the machinery that was conditionally assigned to the “unperfected” seller in that case, the 
trustee was unable to recover the property for the benefit of the debtor’s other creditors.  Id. at 
353.
129
 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412 § 8, 36 Stat. 838,840.
130
 45 Cong. Rec. 2271 (1910).
131 See Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 
18 (1973).
132 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1).  Section 544(a)(3) gives the bankruptcy trustee the rights and 
powers of “a bona fide purchaser of real property . . . from the debtor, against whom applicable 
law permits such transfer to be perfected.”  11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3).  This section differs from 
544(a)(1) in several respects, including that it implies in law that the trustee has the rights of a 
“bona fide purchaser.”  Ordinarily, lien creditors (i.e., the bankruptcy trustee under section 
544(a)(1)) are not “bona fide purchasers.”  See, e.g., Rev. § 1-201(32) (defining “purchase” so to 
exclude “involuntary” conveyances).
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If deterring the creation of secret interests in a debtor’s property was the 
purpose of the strong-arm power, one might think that merely technical failures in 
notice, which did not meaningfully impair the quality of the notice actually given, 
would not expose the transaction to avoidance.  That is, to the extent that notice 
was actually given, the transaction should be good against the bankruptcy trustee, 
since the transaction was no longer “secret.”  
That, however, is not the way avoidance law developed.  Case law under the 
strong-arm power is replete with instances of secured parties losing their security 
interests for reasons that appear, in retrospect, to have been nit-picky, at best, and 
capricious at worst.133  Initially, it was thought that these injustices could be 
attributed to the arcane statutes that governed secured transactions prior to general 
enactment of the U.C.C.134  The great formalities that attended pre-code law 
created ample opportunities for aggressive trustee’s counsel.135  Yet, it remains 
clear that even under the U.C.C., trustee’s counsel has been able to exploit 
seemingly innocuous footfaults in the notice given.  Mistakes in the debtor’s 
name,136 descriptions of collateral137 or the place of filing138 have all been used 
against the secured party.
133 See White, Wasteful Litigation supra  note [] at [] (collecting cases); Lipson, Information 
Technology supra note 120.
134 See Coogan, supra note [], at 319 (“The secured party has had a rough time with the filing 
systems of pre-Code chattel security law.  Decision after decision, to say nothing of the statutes 
themselves, has disregarded the real function of a filing or recording system–namely, to give 
notice to other creditors of the actual or possible existence of security interests in property which 
appears to be owned by the debtor.”).  See generally David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent 
Seeking, 79 MINN. L. REV. 817, 834(“It cannot be denied . .  that debtor’s counsel and bankruptcy 
judges exult in hanging a secured creditor out to dry for the most inconsequential mistakes.”)
135
 Some of the older cases are collected by Coogan, supra note [], at 291, note [], and include In re 
Urban, 136 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1943) (absence of affidavit); In re International Harvester Co., 9 
F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1925) (copy of affidavit not sufficient); In re Leven, 42 F. Supp. 484 (D. Md. 
1941) (affiant failed disclose agency status); Sickinger v. Zimel, 6 N.J. 149, 77 A.2d 905 (1951) 
(false recital of consideration); In re Holley, 25 F.2d 979 (N.D. Iowa 1928) (failure to disclose title 
of subscribing notary); Amberson Inv. Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 266 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1959) (recorded 
mortgage failed to recite maturity date of secured note); In re Production Aids Co., 193 F. Supp. 
180, 185 (S.D. Iowa 1961) (failure to indicate corporate authority to sign); Nordman v. Rau, 86 
Kan. 19, 119 Pac. 351 (1911) Rhode Island Hosp. Nat’l Bank v. Larson, 137 Conn. 541, 79 A.2d 
182 (1951) (failure to specify day when monthly payments were due).
136 See, e.g., ITT Commercial Fin. v. Bank of the West, 166 F.3d 295 (1999)(filing against 
“Compucentro, USA, Inc.” ineffective where debtor’s name is “Compu-Centro, USA, Inc.”); In re 
Tyler, 23 B.R. 806 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (filing against “Tri-Molded Plastics, Inc.” ineffective 
where debtor’s name is “Tri-Moulded Plastics, Inc.”).
137 In re K.L. Smith Enters., Ltd., 2 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (laying hens were 
“livestock,” not “equipment” or “inventory”); See also In re Northeast Chick Serv., Inc., 43 Bankr. 
326 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (chickens were “farm products” not “inventory”).
138
 Perhaps the leading candidate here is In re Peregrine Entm’t, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 1990), which held that, even though the secured party filed effective UCC-1 financing 
statements, its security interest in the debtor’s library of copyrighted films and the proceeds from 
those films (royalties) was not perfected because not recorded in the Copyright Office.  See 
The End of Notice Page 28 of 74 
 
C:\inetpub\ wwwroot\results\4381-text.native.1091721321.doc; 8/5/2004 11:50 AM
It is not clear how these uses of the strong-arm power support the 
informational goals of notice-filing.  If, as may well have been true in many of 
these cases, the community of creditors knew or had reason to know that the 
debtor’s property was encumbered, it is not clear that a minor error in the debtor’s 
name or collateral description created a secret lien, perpetrated a fraud, or 
otherwise violated norms of the applicable merchant community.  It may be that 
the strong-arm power is a necessary evil, exerting in terrorem force over 
creditors, compelling them (as the Clow court suggested) to “leave nothing 
unperformed, within the compass of their power, to secure third persons from the 
consequences of the apparent ownership of the vendor.”139  But simply asking 
lenders to do more does not necessarily assure that the community of creditors 
will have a meaningful understanding of what the debtor has.
As discussed in the next two sections, the legislative response is not likely to 
produce more or better information.  Rather, we have seen increasingly 
sophisticated attempts to exempt transactions from the obligation to give notice at 
all.  Sometimes, as with data and intellectual property, the exemptions will be an 
inadvertent byproduct of the unusual interactions of new technologies and old 
rules.  In other cases, however, it is clear that those who draft commercial finance 
legislation seek affirmatively to undermine the role of notice-filing.
II. The End of Notice-filing – Three Secret Liens
While the intuitive link between property rights and notice obligations enjoys 
both theoretical and historical support, it would appear that commercial finance 
law has other ideas.  Although revised Article 9 of the U.C.C. continues to require 
notice-filing in a broad range of transactions, notice-filing will, as discussed 
below, often have little effect in transactions involving increasingly important 
collateral, such as data, intellectual property and bank and brokerage accounts.  
Moreover, securitization “facilitation” statutes have the potential to render notice-
filing entirely optional.  This section summarizes how recent legislative 
developments tolerate, if not promote, the creation of secret liens.
A. Security Interests in Data and Intellectual Property – Rules on Proceeds 
and Continuity of Interest
A shallow reading of Article 9 of the U.C.C. might lead to the conclusion that 
secret liens will be a rarity.  U.C.C. § 9-310(a) provides that perfection of a 
security interest presumptively requires the filing of a financing statement.140
U.C.C. § 9-310(b)(9), however, contains an important exception for security 
interests in “proceeds.”  Because revised Article 9 has greatly expanded the 
definition of proceeds,
141
 its rules will often (unwittingly) create secret liens on data 
Lipson, Information Technologies, supra note 120, at 1071 (lamenting unfairness of apparent 
arbitrariness of perfection rules as applied to information technology collateral).
139
 Clow v. Woods, 5 Serb. & Rawle, at 282 (Gibson, J.) (emphasis in original).
140
 U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Section 9-312(b), a 
financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests . . . “).
141
Comment 13 to section 9-102 explains that “[t]he revised definition of ‘proceeds’ expands the 
The End of Notice Page 29 of 74 
 
C:\inetpub\ wwwroot\results\4381-text.native.1091721321.doc; 8/5/2004 11:50 AM
and intellectual property.142
A “proceeds” security interest arises in at least three ways that might create 
secret liens.  First, revised section 9-102(a)(64)(A) defines proceeds as including, 
among other things, “whatever is acquired upon the . . . license . . . of collateral.”
143
This means that licenses of a copyright or patent, for example, should be “proceeds” 
of the original collateral.
144
  Second, revised section 9-102(a)(64)(A) provides that the 
secured party may pursue proceeds in the hands of parties other than the debtor.
145
This means that, unless a license is “ordinary course” (non-exclusive), the security 
interest continues even as to third party licensees, sub-licensees, and so on.146
Third, revised section 9-102(a)(64)(C) provides that proceeds include “rights 
arising out of collateral.”
147
 This cryptic phrase is not explained in the Official 
Comment. It may, however, be quite expansive and pick up all kinds of rights 
associated with original collateral, including intangible rights in technologies and data 
associated with original collateral.
148
 I have argued elsewhere that this should mean 
that a patent is proceeds of a trade secret, and a derivative work under the Copyright 
Act is proceeds of a security interest in a copyright.
149
 In both cases, the later rights 
“arise out of” the earlier rights. This is one reason security interests in data and 
intellectual property will arise secretly. It is highly unlikely that a debtor granting a 
security interest in one copyright understands that it is, as a matter of law, also 
definition beyond that contained in former section 9-306.” § 9-102 cmt. 13 (2001).
142 See generally Lipson, Remote Control supra note 120 (discussing affect of rules on proceeds 
and continuity of interest on intellectual property and data).
143
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(A) (2001).
144
Compare In re Transp. Design and Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. at 640 (declining to treat patent as proceeds of 
patent application under former Article 9), with Lipson, Information Technologies, supra note 120, at 
1135–36 (questioning continued viability of Transportation Design rule in light of revised Article 9). 
145
Courts applying former Article 9 had come to this conclusion. See, e.g., Centerre Bank, N.A. v. New 
Holland Div. of Sperry Corp., 832 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 27 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 1217 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979); Eastern Idaho Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Idaho Gem, 
Inc., 842 P.2d 282 (Idaho 1992); First State Bank v. Clark, 635 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 2001). There was, 
however, a split of authority on the issue. See First State Bank, 635 N.W.2d at 30 (discussing split).   The 
Official Comment now emphasizes the point: “This Article contains no requirement that property ‘be 
received’ by the debtor for the property to qualify as proceeds.” U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 13(d) (2001).
146
 Article 9 provides that, as a general matter, security interests continue in collateral 
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition.  U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1).  Security interests will 
be cut off, however, if such a transaction is in “ordinary course.”  U.C.C §§ 9-320 (ordinary course 
disposition of goods) & 9-321 (ordinary course license of general intangibles).  A license will only 
be “ordinary course” if, among other things, it is “non-exclusive” and in the ordinary course of the 
licensor’s business.  See U.C.C. § 9-321(a).  See generally Lipson, Remote Control, supra note 
120 (discussing continuity of interest rules).
147
Id. § 9-102(a)(64)(C) (2001).
148
See Lipson, Information Technologies, supra note 87, at 1132–38. 
149
Id.
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granting a security interest in all derivative works it later produces.
150
The rules on the perfection of security interests in proceeds are complex, but the 
basic idea is that the security interest in proceeds will be perfected if the security 
interest in the original collateral was perfected151 and any one of three things is true: (i) 
the financing statement that was filed to cover the original collateral does (or could) 
cover the proceeds, (ii) the proceeds are cash or cash equivalents, or (iii) the security 
interest in the proceeds becomes perfected in some other way.152  It will be fairly easy 
to satisfy at least one of these requirements, especially when the collateral is data or 
intellectual property.153  But satisfying these requirements does not necessarily mean 
that anyone is likely to know anything about the proceeds security interest.
Consider an example.  Assume that D is an internet retailer of toys.  D 
finances its inventory with money borrowed from SP.  SP takes a security interest 
in D’s inventory, which SP perfects by filing a financing statement indicating a 
security interest in “inventory.”  Assume further, as is often the case, that when D 
sells toys in the ordinary course, it collects spending, demographic and similar 
information about its customers.  Finally, assume that D sells or licenses its list of 
customer information to a data aggregator, (B/L).  
Presumably, B/L would believe that it was acquiring its interest in this 
customer data free of the property claims of others.  Even if B/L was highly 
diligent, and conducted a lien search, it would only find a financing statement 
describing a security interest in “inventory” not “data” (or “general intangibles,” 
the UCC label most likely to cover customer data).154  But SP would have a 
perfected security interest in this data, because it is proceeds of the debtor’s 
inventory, and there is no “good faith purchaser” rule that would apply to cut off 
SP’s security interest.155  And, if B/L sold or licensed this list to others – even 
150
Of course, to the extent the debtor simply granted a security interest in “general intangibles,” all 
copyrights would be covered, whether or not derivative works.  Moreover, as discussed in note 168 
supra, the instability of the rules on perfecting security interests in intellectual property may provide 
some cover for debtors who unwittingly grant security interests in derivative works. The security interest 
may attach automatically, by virtue of the proceeds rules, but would have little practical force if not
perfected.
151
 U.C.C. § 9-315(c).
152
 U.C.C. § 9-315(d).
153
 Usually, it will be satisfied by the first alternative because data and intellectual property are 
general intangibles in which a security interest could be perfected by the filing of a financing 
statement.  See U.C.C. §§ 9-310(a) & 9-315(d)(1)(2001).
154 See U.C.C. 9-102(a)(42)(defining general intangibles).  See also Lipson, Information 
Technologies, supra note 120, at [] (discussing data as general intangibles under UCC).  
155
 See U.C.C 9-321 (2001).  This section provides that a “licensee in ordinary course of business 
takes its rights under a nonexclusive license free of a security interest in the general intangible 
created by the licensor, even if the security interest is perfected and the licensee knows of its 
existence.” A “licensee in ordinary course of business” is defined as “a person that becomes a 
licensee of a general intangible in good faith, without knowledge that the license violates the rights 
of another person in the general intangible, and in the ordinary course from a person in the 
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with D’s permission – the party that acquired the data from B/L (B/L2) would 
take the data subject to the same encumbrance.  Here, it is virtually inconceivable 
that B/L2 would be able to discover SP’s security interest, assuming B/L2 even 
thought to look for it.  It is not clear how the UCC-1 filed by SP as to D would put 
B/L or B/L2 on notice of anything.  A clean record as to B/L2 would be false –
SP’s secret lien would survive, and would be enforceable against B/L2.  
The full magnitude of this problem is difficult to gauge.  In theory, of course, 
it should mean that most data in the computers of most businesses is encumbered 
in ways (and by parties) not anticipated by the owners (or users) of the data.  That 
said, should SP actually show up and claim the right  to freeze or seize B/L2’s 
computer, B/L2 may be able to argue that the data is not “property,” in which case 
no security interest would be possible.156   This argument seems a bit recondite
and implausible, since B/L2 probably treats the data as it would treat its other 
valuable property.  In any case, the jury is out on the question whether data is 
property for these purposes.157
A better argument might be one of impossibility.  SP may have a security 
interest in the data, but, B/L2 would argue, so too would a large number of 
unnamed, unidentified secured parties, whose proceeds security interests all arose 
in more or less the same way.  The data  may, in other words, be so fully 
encumbered that no one could sort out the real rights in it.  An “anti-commons” 
would infect the data like a regenerating computer virus.158  Observe, however, 
that these arguments, whatever their merits, do not come from Article 9.  B/L2 
wins only if Article 9 is somehow neutralized.
What if the problem involved intellectual property, rather than data?  Assume, 
for example, that D developed a data management software program which it 
licensed to B/L.  Assume further that the security agreement with SP includes 
general intangibles, the category that would most likely describe intellectual 
property.  The software would be subject to the U.S. Copyright Act which would, 
for certain purposes, preempt Article 9.159  Until recently, there was some reason 
to believe that the Copyright Act preempted all of Article 9’s rules on the 
perfection of security interests.160  If so, B/L might have argued that unless the 
security interest was actually recorded in the Copyright Office, the security 
business of licensing general intangibles of that kind.”  Id. § 9-321(a).  See also Lipson, 
Information Technology, supra note 120.
156 See Lipson, Remote Control, supra note 120, at 1350-1356.
157See Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property:  Generating and Protecting Information Privacy Norms 
in Bankruptcy,  44 WM. MARY L. REV. 1801, 1840 (2003) (discussing property rights treatment of 
data).
158 See Lipson, Remote Control, supra note 120, at 1410-1411 (citing Michael A. Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 621 (1998)).
159 See Lipson, Information Technology, supra note 120, at 1107.
160 See Lipson, Information Technology, supra note 120, at 1107-1114 (discussing preemptive 
force of Copyright Act).
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interest would have been unperfected.  If unperfected (because undiscoverable in 
the copyright records), then B/L’s rights would have had priority over SP under 
most circumstances.
Recent case law suggests that preemption will no longer protect the B/L’s of 
the world if the underlying copyright is not registered.161  In In re World Auxiliary 
Power, the debtor had granted security interests in certain unregistered copyrights.  
The bank filed UCC-1 financing statements as required by the U.C.C., but did not 
record the security interest with the United States Copyright Office (the 
"Copyright Office").  The debtor’s bankruptcy trustee attempted to sell the 
copyrights free of the bank’s security interests, but the bankruptcy court sustained 
the banks’ objections, finding that the bank perfected its security interest in 
unregistered copyrights by filing and recording its security interest in accordance 
with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and 
held that federal copyright law does not preempt state law with respect to 
perfection and priority of security interests in unregistered copyrights. “There is 
no reason to infer from Congress's silence as to unregistered copyrights,” the 
court wrote, “an intent to make such copyrights useless as collateral by 
preempting state law but not providing any federal priority scheme for 
unregistered copyrights.   That would amount to a presumption in favor of federal 
preemption, but we are required to presume just the opposite”162
Recording copyrights and registering security interests in them would 
undoubtedly be a cumbersome, expensive and time-consuming proposition, one 
which I have certainly not advocated.163  Nevertheless, it is important to see that 
whenever a security interest arises in a copyright, it will automatically arise in a 
license of that copyright.  World Auxiliary Power makes it easier to perfect the 
security interest in both the original copyright and the license.  If the license is not 
ordinary course, the security interest will continue and the licensee may have no 
idea that it is taking its license subject to the prior interest of the licensor’s bank.  
As with data, the problem grows as intellectual property is sublicensed and 
subdivided, moving further and further away from the parties that initially created 
the encumbrance.  While sublicensees may take subject to the security interest, it 
will (like all secret liens) be difficult to discover ex ante.
The bottom line, then, is that whole categories of increasingly important assets 
may be encumbered by secret liens.  It should be noted that revised Article 9 is 
not entirely responsible for this state of affairs.  Even prior iterations, which might 
have required notice more of the time, tolerated remote proceeds security 
interests, which effectively create secret liens.164  Rather, the problems arise from 
161 In re World Auxiliary Power Company, 303 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2002).
162
 303 F.3d at 1131 (citations omitted).
163 See Lipson, Information Technologies, supra note 120.
164
 Professor LoPucki catalogued ways that a debtor so inclined could fool creditors by secretly 
encumbering property while still complying with the prior (more notice-friendly) version of 
Article 9.  See Lynn M. LoPucki, Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on 
Building the Electronic Highway, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1992, at 7-9.
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expanding the definition of proceeds to capture property that happens to be 
unusually mobile and mutable.  Together these developments insure a much larger 
universe of secret liens than we would intuitively expect commercial finance law
to tolerate.
B. Control Security Interests 
A second source of secret liens will arise by virtue of new rules on the creation of 
“control” security interests in bank and brokerage accounts.  One of Revised Article 
9’s major changes from prior law involves the use of control as a means of creating 
and perfecting a security interest.  Generally speaking, a secured party will have 
control of certain types of collateral –deposit accounts, investment property, electronic 
chattel paper or letter-of-credit rights165 – if the secured party has the right to dispose 
of the property in question.  Because control arises solely by operation of law or 
contract, notice filing is either not required or not permitted.166
Although the statute does not make this distinction, there would appear to be two 
different kinds of control, bilateral and trilateral.  Bilateral control involves two 
parties, such as, a bank and a depositor/borrower. U.C.C. § 9-104 automatically gives 
the secured party that is also a debtor’s depositary bank a security interest in the 
account in question.  Because security interests in deposit accounts as original 
collateral (not proceeds) may only be perfected by control, the bank need not give 
notice of its security interest in the bank account.
Bilateral control has much in common with the right of set-off.  Set-off says that a 
creditor may apply amounts it owes to a debtor to reduce the debtor’s obligation to the 
creditor.  The classic examples involved bank accounts held at banks that also made 
loans to the borrower.  Because a deposit account is simply a debt the bank owes the 
depositor, set-off permits the bank to apply the amount credited to the account 
(meaning owning to the debtor) against any amounts the debtor owes the creditor 
(meaning the loan the debtor is obligated to pay the secured party).  Although the 
UCC does not generally govern the right of set off, the right has often been 
characterized as a kind of equitable security interest.167
165
 U.C.C. §§ 9-106, 9-104, 9-105, 9-107 & 9-314(a) (2001). 
166
 As to deposit accounts, filing was apparently considered and rejected early in the process of 
revising Article 9.  See Markell, supra note [], at 983 (citing PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE 
UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9: REPORT 70 
(1992)).
167See In re Communication Dynamics, Inc., 300 B.R. 220, 223 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (“In 
essence, the right of setoff ‘elevates an unsecured claim to secured status, to the extent that the 
debtor has a mutual, prepetition claim against the creditor.’”) (quoting University Med. Ctr. v. 
Sullivan (In re University Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1079 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Former U.C.C. § 9-104 declared the article to be inapplicable “to any right of setoff.”  
However, rights of setoff are expressly recognized currently at U.C.C. §§ 9-306(d)(i), 9-318(1).  
Whether a creditor seeking to assert a right of set off must abide by Article 9’s notice-filing rules 
is somewhat unclear.  In In re Apex Oil Co., the court observed that “[w]hile we agree with Artoc 
that a bank or other creditor need not comply with Article 9 and its filing requirements to exercise 
its right to setoff, we do believe that Article 9 governs the priority between that right to setoff and 
a perfected security interest.”  In re Apex Oil Co., 975 F.2d 1365, 1368 (1992); aff’d Apex Oil Co. 
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Bilateral control is distinct from trilateral control.  Trilateral control occurs where 
the secured party is not also the entity that maintains the account.  For example, a 
secured party has control of a deposit account if the depositary bank enters into an 
agreement (known as a control agreement) with the secured party that the 
depositary bank will comply with instructions from the secured party as to the 
funds in the deposit account, without further consent from the debtor.168  As with 
bilateral control, trilateral control arises strictly by contract.  Notice-filing is 
neither permitted nor effective.
Control is justified as a method of perfection as to deposit accounts, brokerage 
accounts, and so forth because there is assumed to be a kind of community 
v. Artoc Bank & Trust Ltd., 265 B.R. 144 (2001).  Some opinions holding that Article 9 governs 
set-off priority have relied on old UCC § 9-312(5), reasoning that a security interest perfected 
before the exercise of the set-off is entitled to priority over the set-off based on the ''first in time, 
first in right'' principle which these courts find to be in § 9-312(5).  Whether relying on § 9-201 or 
§ 9-312, the line of authority which gives priority to the secured creditor over the set-off claimant 
has developed to the point where this view has now been described as the ''majority'' approach.  
The ''majority'' rule gives the priority to the debtor's secured creditor rather than the bank 
attempting to set-off the account, as long as the secured creditor has a perfected interest in the 
account as proceeds of collateral. 
Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust illustrates the absolute reach of the 
proceeds interest under this interpretation.  Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank and Trust, 717 P.2d 
1341, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 961 (Utah 1986). There, Insley sold backhoes to Schneider on a 
secured basis.  Its interests extended to proceeds of the backhoes and was perfected by filing. 
Schneider sold two of the backhoes to O'Brien for $237,918.00, depositing O'Brien's check into its 
overdrawn bank account at Draper Bank.  The bank then set-off against the account for the 
overdraft owed to it. The court held that old ' 9-201 of the U.C.C. gave Insley the priority claim 
over the bank. Any other result, it reasoned, would undermine Article 9's reliance on public filing 
and its repeal of policing requirements in the old ' 9-205.  The bank was precluded from arguing 
that it took free of the security interest as a holder in due course since that argument was not made 
in the court below.   
However, the Insley court reasoned that even if this argument could be made, it could only 
protect the bank in taking the check.  Setting off against a deposit credit which was proceeds for 
the check would not be protected by the holder in due course rule.  The Insley opinion shows that 
Courts are attracted to the 'majority' rule, discussed above, because they feel that it is necessary to 
maintain the Article 9 scheme of priorities. In sum, an unfiled, unsecured bank should not jump 
ahead of a secured creditor with a filing as to inventory, accounts, chattel paper or other assets of 
the debtor.  Consequently, a bank should file a financing statement when they want to exercise a 
right of setoff to maintain priority over other secured parties, but don’t necessarily have to file to 
exercise that right.  See also Te Salle, Banker's Right to Setoff, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 40 (1981). Other 
decisions holding that Article 9 gives a secured party and automatic victory over a setoff include 
Credit Alliance Corp. v. National Bank of Georgia N.A., 718 F.Supp. 954, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d 184 (N.D. Ga. 1989); National Acceptance Co. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498 F. Supp. 1078, 30 
U.C.C. Rep. Serve. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1980); Continental Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 251 Ga. 412, 
306 S.E.2d 285, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1737 (1983); Southeastern Fin. Corp. v. National Bank of 
Detroit, 145 Mich. App. 717, 377 N.W.2d 900, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 603 (1985); In re Calore 
Express Co., 199 B.R. 424, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 421 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996); Morris Plan Co. 
v. Broadway Nat’l Bank, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980);  Valley Nat’l Bank v. 
Cotton Growers Hail Ins., Inc., 747 P.2d 1225, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) 
(a secured creditor had priority over insurer’s set off for unpaid policy premium.)
168
 Rev. § 9-104(a).
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knowledge about the kinds of property in which a security interest may be 
perfected by control.  “No other form of notice is necessary” to perfect a security 
interest in a deposit account, for example, because “all actual or potential 
creditors of the debtor are always on notice that the bank with which the debtor’s 
deposit account is maintained may assert a claim against the deposit account.”169
Permitting perfection of a security interest by control therefore represents “a 
pragmatic judgment” by the drafters of Revised Article 9 that these security 
interests are, in important respects, “public and unambiguous.”170
Where there is “general knowledge” in an industry that certain kinds of 
property may be held subject to certain kinds of noncustodial claims (e.g., brokers 
always hold securities subject to the claims of other broker-dealers or lending 
institutions), it may be appropriate to dispense with public notice-filing.171  The 
“community” of banks and brokers knows or assumes that debtors’ deposit and 
brokerage accounts are likely to be encumbered, so they could not possibly rely to 
their detriment on a “clean” lien search.  There is presumed to be no “secret” 
because “everyone” knows.  
But this begs the question, who is “everyone?”  Consider an example.  
Assume that debtor (D) purchases an item of equipment with purchase-money 
financing from the vendor (V).  Under U.C.C. §§ 9-103, V has a purchase-money 
security interest in the item of equipment.  If V perfects the security interest by 
filing an effective financing statement when the debtor receives the equipment, or 
within 20 days thereafter, V would have priority over any competing, prior 
security interest held by SP.172  V would also believe that it has priority in the 
identifiable cash proceeds associated with the equipment.173  Thus, if D sold the 
equipment or it was lost or destroyed, V would reasonably suppose that it has a 
proceeds security interest in whatever was received upon this disposition or loss, 
169
 U.C.C. § 9-104, cmt 3.  
170
 Schroeder, Surrealism, supra note [] at 523-24.
171 Cf. Schroeder Surrealism, supra note [], at 522.  Of course, on this logic, no filing or other 
public notice should ever be required, since there is “general knowledge” about the kinds of
borrowers that grant security interests in their assets, and what kinds of assets those might be.  
Professor Schroeder does acknowledge that a security interest, like any interest in property, must 
involve public recognition of the interest.  Using a Hegelian analysis, she suggests that property 
“involves the publicly recognizable identification of a specific object to a specific legal subject 
with some rights to control, and exclude others from, the object.”  Schroeder, Surrealism, supra at 
527 (citing, among other things, G.W.F. HEGEL. ELEMENTS OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 52-53 
& 58 (Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991).  Although she appears to support control as 
a method of perfection, it is not clear how that method would be “publicly recognizable,” except 
among the parties to the contract.
172
 U.C.C. § 9-324(a) provides that “a perfected purchase-money security interest in [equipment] 
has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same goods, and, except as provided in 
Section 9-327, a perfected security interest in its identifiable proceeds also has priority, if the 
purchase-money security interest was perfected when the debtor receives possession of the 
collateral or within 20 days thereafter.”  
173
 Id.
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such as the purchase price D received or insurance payable with respect to the 
equipment.174
V might also reasonably expect that it has priority in these proceeds.  But V is 
likely to be wrong.  9-324(a) provides that the purchase-money priority in 
proceeds is subject to Section 9-327, which sets forth the rules on the priority of 
control security interests.  If the cash proceeds from the sale or loss of the 
equipment were deposited in a bank account maintained by D, there is no easy 
way that V can be sure that the bank that maintains D’s account (B) does not have 
a control-perfected security interest in the account.  It will be possible to verify 
that D has not granted a security interest in the account to B, but it would take 
more than a typical lien search.
Not only will the lien itself be secret, but if and when V discovers it, she will 
also find that it has priority over her security interest, despite the purchase-money 
for which she bargained, and which (so long as the collateral is intact) is assured 
by compliance with U.C.C. § 9-103.  This is because B would not only have the 
security interest in the account, but it would also have priority, even though the 
funds in the account may be proceeds of V’s equipment, and even though the 
proceeds would otherwise be entitled to purchase-money priority.175  As the 
comment to section 9-327 explains, “security interests perfected by control . . . 
take priority over those perfected otherwise, e.g., as identifiable cash proceeds . . . 
.”
176
How would V protect herself from the secret lien permitted by the control 
security interest in a deposit account?  Presumably, determining the existence and 
nature of a control security interest would require consultation with the parties 
involved – the debtor, the secured party and (in the case of trilateral control) the 
bank or broker that maintains the accounts.  It is also to be assumed that the banks 
and brokers would not collude with a debtor that fraudulently concealed the grant 
of a control security interest.  There is, however, no way to assure that a debtor 
has not entered into a control agreement.  Under U.C.C. § 9-342, a bank that has 
entered into a control security agreement is “not required to confirm the existence 
of the agreement to another person” unless the bank’s customer (i.e., the debtor) 
so requests.177 A similar rule obtains with respect to securities intermediaries (or 
issuers) who are parties to control agreements.178  It is not clear how much 
comfort one can ever take in a statement that the debtor has not encumbered these 
174
 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (defining proceeds).
175
 See U.C.C. § 9-322(c) & 9-327(1)(“A security interest held by a secured party having control 
of [a] deposit account under Section 9-104 has priority over a conflicting security interest held by 
a secured party that does not have control.”).
176
 U.C.C. § 9-327, cmt. 3.
177
 U.C.C. § 9-342.
178 U.C.C. § 8-106(g).
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assets.  These assurances may well turn out to be false, and there would be little or 
no recourse for the aggrieved party.179
V could also resort to other contractual protections.  She could, for example, 
ask the debtor and the insurance company have her named as loss payee with 
respect to the equipment.  If so, and the casualty check was actually sent to V, her 
expectations would be protected.180  Alternatively, V could enter into a 
subordination agreement with B, whereby B would agree that V would have 
priority in D’s account with respect to any casualty payments arising from 
damage to the collateral.181  But there is no guarantee that the other parties will 
enter into these agreements.  In any event, it is difficult to imagine these 
contractual solutions are more efficient than a notice-filing system that would 
readily alert V to the existence of B’s security interest and determine its priority 
ex ante.  While control may bring important benefits to the banks and brokerages 
that sought this type of protection in revised Article 9, it is not clear that much 
consideration was given to costs associated with the secret liens that these 
transactions create.
C. Asset Securitizations
New twists on old secured transactions are not the only potential source of 
secret liens in commercial finance law.  Recent statutory attempts to “facilitate” 
the development of asset securitization potentially dispense with notice-filing 
entirely.  Under certain of these statutes, if a contract transferring property uses 
statutory language, the transfer will be effective even if in secret, and even if other 
law required notice of it.
Although several states have enacted such laws, the most important is 
Delaware’s “Asset-Backed Securities Facilitation Act” (“ABSFA”).182  ABSFA 
179
 Because the bank and broker have no duty to disclose anything, and no relationship with the 
other lender/acquiror, it is not clear how liability could be established. 
180
 Ironically, this would be true even if V did not otherwise have purchase-money priority, since 
the possessory security interest in a negotiable instrument will always have priority over any 
competing interest in the same instrument.  U.C.C. §§ 9-330(d) & 9-331(a) (2001). 
181
 U.C.C. § 9-339 (2001).
182
 73 Del. Laws 214; 2001 Del. ALS 214; 2001 Del. HB 348; codified in Title 6, Chapter 27A, of 
the Delaware Code.  Other states with facilitation statutes are Alabama, ALA. CODE 1975 § 35-
10A-2(a)(1) (2002); Louisiana, LA. R.S. 10:9-109(e) (2002); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
25-9A-102 (2002); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (West 2002); Texas, TX. BUS. & COM. 
§ 9.109(e) (2002).  The statutes in Alabama, Ohio, and North Carolina are substantially similar to 
ABSFA, with all but Ohio’s statute entitled “Asset-Backed Securities Facilitation Act.”  ALA. 
CODE 1975 § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9A-102 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1109.75 (West 2002).  Texas and Louisiana, by contrast, simply added a new subsection to 
Article 9 of the revised UCC that left it up to the parties involved in securitization transactions to 
classify the nature of transfers. TX. BUS. & COM. § 9.109(e) (2002); LA. R.S. 10:9-109(e) (2002).
Louisiana’s Article 9, for example, provides:
The application of this chapter to the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or 
promissory notes is not to recharacterize that sale as a transaction to secure indebtedness but 
to protect purchasers of those assets by providing a notice filing system. For all purposes, in 
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essentially contemplates a complete opt out of Article 9 (and, if the statute means 
what it says, any other law that may conflict with the securitization contracts).  
“Asset securitizations” are generally defined as “the sale of equity or debt 
instruments, representing ownership interests in [an], . . . income-producing asset
or pool of assets. . . structured to reduce or reallocate certain risks inherent in 
owning or lending against the underlying assets."183
A securitization typically involves at least two parties: 
1. The “originator” is the original owner (and creator) of the financial 
assets (such as accounts receivable, lease payments, credit card receivables or 
mortgage receivables) that are the subject of the securitization transaction.  The 
originator might, for example, be an equipment leasing company which is owed 
lease payments from its lessees.  The lessee’s payment obligations are an asset of 
the originator.  
2. The “special purpose entity” is the initial purchaser of these eligible 
assets and is often called an “SPE.” 184
Like a secured transaction, a major component of a securitization is a property 
transfer.  The goal of a securitization is a “true sale” of financial assets from the 
originator to the SPE.  If the transfer of these assets is a true sale, then the assets 
should be insulated from the originator’s economic troubles.185  If, instead, the 
transfer is not a true sale – but is, for example, a transfer for security (i.e., a 
disguised financing) – the originator’s bankruptcy estate would retain an interest 
in the assets.  The assets would then be subject to the many provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code that constrain third parties from acting with respect to property 
of the debtor’s estate.  
An effective securitization should free the securitization provider (or, more 
particularly, those holding the securities issued in the transaction) from 
Bankruptcy Code provisions staying acts to obtain possession of, or collect from, 
the absence of fraud or intentional misrepresentation, the parties' characterization of a 
transaction as a sale of such assets shall be conclusive that the transaction is a sale and is not a 
secured transaction and that title, legal and equitable, has passed to the party characterized as 
the purchaser of those assets regardless of whether the secured party has any recourse against 
the debtor, whether the debtor is entitled to any surplus, or any other term of the parties' 
agreement.
   Tx. Bus. & Com. § 9.109(e) (2002); La. R.S. 10:9-109(e) (2002).
183
 Tamar Frankel, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND 
ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 1995).  See also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of 
Asset Securitization, 1 STANFORD J. L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994); STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, 
STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d. ed. 2002); 
SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000).
184
 Securitizations may also involve a third entity that purchases the eligible assets    from the SPE 
and issues the securities backed by the income stream they produce.
185
 Thomas J. Gordon, Securitization of Executory Future Flows as Bankruptcy-Remote True 
Sales, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2000) (securitization eliminates risk of regular unsecured 
and secured arrangements). 
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property of the debtor’s estate,186 permitting the debtor to use cash collateral,187
and to cram-down secured claims in a plan of reorganization.188  Indeed, it is 
sometimes claimed that the “efficiency” of securitization derives, in part, from 
separating the debtor (and the debtor’s other creditors) from these assets.189
Although estimates of the value of the securitization market vary, it is generally 
viewed as involving in excess of two trillion dollars at any given point in time.190
If securitization transactions always involved arms-length, fair-value sales of 
payment rights (e.g., receivables), they would likely present few problems.191
However, securitization transactions are often structured in such a way that the 
originator retains the risk that there will be a default (or other problem) with the 
underlying assets.  For example, the originator may be required to repurchase 
these assets from the SPE in the event the underlying account obligor defaults.  
As and to the extent there is recourse to the originator, the transaction looks less 
like a “true sale” and more like a secured financing.192
Although asset securitization is a comparatively recent development in 
commercial finance, the true sale problem has been around in one form or another 
for many years.193  On the one hand, our law has long permitted a buyer to “put” 
defective assets back to a seller on, e.g., a breach of warranty theory without 
calling into question the sale character of the transaction.194  On the other hand, 
186
 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) & (6).
187
 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)
188
 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
189
 See generally Minh Van Ngo, Agency Costs and the Demand and Supply of Secured Debt and 
Asset Securitization, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 413, 458 (2002); Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A 
Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 1061 (1996); See also Lynn M. LoPucki, The 
Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1996) (discussing benefits of asset securitization where 
company keeps valuable assets separate from entities at risk).
190
 A recent symposium issue of the Cardozo Law Review suggests that securitization may be 
overtaking and displacing secured lending as the dominant form of commercial finance.  
Symposium: Threats to Secured Lending and Asset Securitization: The Bankruptcy Code, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. [] (2004).
191
 If, in other words, they were not “judgment proofing” devices. See LoPucki, supra note [], at [].
192
  Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial Assets, 52 
BUS. LAW. 159, 161 (1996); Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, 
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 287, 307-08 (1991) (arguing that payment of the full value, not the 
existence of recourse, should constitute the border between sales of and security interests in 
accounts and chattel paper); Schwarcz, Structured Finance, supra note [], at 621-27; Peter L. 
Mancini, Note, Bankruptcy and the U.C.C. as Applied to Securitization: Characterizing a 
Mortgage Loan Transfer As a Sale or a Secured Loan, 73 B.U. L. REV. 873, 876-77 (1993).
193 See Pantaleo et al. supra  note [], at 164 (“Recharacterization [true sale] cases are centuries old.  
They illustrate that the law may not treat a transaction as a sale just because the buyer and seller 
labeled it a sale.”)(footnote omitted).
194
 In re Grand Union Co., 219 F. 353 (2d Cir. 1914) (seller of accounts agreed that if the accounts 
were of poor quality, it would repurchase them or pay buyer so as to guarantee a certain rate of 
return for the buyer); Comm. on Bankr. & Corp. Reorganization of the Ass’n of the Bar of the 
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transactions in which the “seller” guarantees payment,195 or a particular return on 
investment,196 or the “buyer” has full recourse to the seller are generally viewed 
as loans, and not sales.197  At the margins it is – and has for many years – been 
difficult to distinguish sales from secured loans.198
The recent history of true sale is dotted with cases in which courts were 
reluctant, for one reason or another, to recognize the putative sale of payment 
obligations.  In 1993, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, in Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve, 
Inc.),199 held that financial assets sold by the debtor prior to its bankruptcy should, 
City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 543-44 (1995) 
(describing forms of recourse that may be permissible in structured finance transactions).   
195 See Ratto v. Sims (In re Lendvest Mortgage, Inc.), 119 B.R. 199, 200 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) 
(“Where the risk of loss is shifted from the investor to the debtor through a contractual guarantee 
of repayment by the debtor, the transaction is a loan and not a sale”).   
196
 See Ables v. Major Funding Corp. (In re Major Funding Corp.), 82 B.R. 443, 445 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 1987); Castle Rock Indus. Bank v. S.O.A.W. Enters, Inc. (In re S.O.A.W. Enters, Inc.), 32 
B.R. 279 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983) (seller originated mortgages, sold certain interests in them to 
buyer, guaranteed the buyer’s recovery on the mortgages and the buyer’s rate of return on its 
investment, indicating the transaction was a loan for security and not a sale).  See also Fireman’s 
Fund Ins. Cos. v. Grover (In re Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 271 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding there 
was no true sale where investors with the debtor, who were alleged to own mortgages originated 
by the debtor, “were paid interest monthly regardless of whether the original borrower paid [the 
debtor].  In the event of default, [the debtor] paid the investor the interest and the principal owing 
on the investor’s [original deposit])”; Merchant’s Transfer &Storage Co. v. Rafferty (In re Gotham 
Can Co.), 48 F.2d 540, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1931) (“The obligation of [the seller] to repay [the buyer] 
all advances [on accounts allegedly sold] in full and to pay certain percentages for the use of the 
money, shows that the transactions were essentially collateral loans, and not sales…”); Peter v. 
Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial Assets, 52Bus. Law. 159 
(1996).  
197
  Burford-Toothaker Tractor Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 891, 894-96 (5th Cir. 1959) 
(transferor assigned customers’ installment contracts to bank, but assignment was with full 
recourse, and bank required periodic payments to be made to the bank by the transferor, whether 
or not the customers had paid on the installment contracts; court held on these facts that no sale of 
the installment contracts occurred).
198
 The true sale question was also central to the dispute in Benedict v. Ratner 268 U.S. 353 
(1925).  There, Justice Brandeis, writing for a unanimous court, held that a sale of future accounts 
receivable was really a disguised financing, and therefore a fraudulent conveyance void against the 
assignor’s bankruptcy trustee.  The purchaser’s failure to exercise “dominion and control” over the 
accounts was a fraud on the debtor’s creditors.  Benedict, 268 U.S. at 363 (holding that the 
assignment was fraudulent “because of dominion reserved. It does not raise a presumption of 
fraud. It imputes fraud conclusively because of the reservation of dominion inconsistent with the 
effective disposition of title and creation of a lien”).  For thoughtful rehabilitations of Benedict, 
see Edward J. Janger, Brandeis, Progressivism, and Commercial Law:  Rethinking Benedict v. 
Ratner, 37 BRAND L. J. 63, 74 (1998)(arguing that Benedict reflected Brandeis’ “’progressive’ 
passion for financial accountability”) & Schroeder, Surrealism, supra note [], at 527-28 (the 
“totally subjective” nature of the assignments prevent creation of a complete property interest in 
the accounts).
199 See Gas Sys Octagon., Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve, Inc.), 995 F.2d 948, 957 n.9 
(10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting view that sale of asset, if perfected, removes it from transferor's 
bankruptcy estate).
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in fact, be included in the debtor's bankruptcy estate.  More recently, and more 
controversially, the court in LTV Steel extended the reasoning of Octagon, to 
conclude that the bankruptcy estate of the originator retained an equitable interest 
in financial and assets and inventory “sold” in a securitization.200
Parties to securitization transactions have attempted to address the true sale 
problem with fairly elaborate structures, and lawyers’ “true sale” opinion letters, 
which ostensibly assuage the bond market and others who invest in securitization 
transactions.  Such structures and opinion letters are not, however, costless.  
Viewing these costs as excessive, the securitization industry has sought to 
establish legislative safe harbors.201 The most prominent effort to obtain a 
statutory safe harbor involved section 912 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
2001.202  This provision would have amended the Bankruptcy Code to provide that 
assets transferred in a qualifying transaction would be deemed not part of the 
debtor’s estate.  In light of the alleged misuse of SPE’s in the Enron case, section 
912 was challenged, and eventually pulled from the Bankruptcy Reform Act.203
Nevertheless, several states have enacted non-uniform statutes which would 
reach the same result, although they take a more circuitous and troubling route.204
Delaware’s ABSFA is perhaps the most aggressive example of this.  It declares 
legislatively that a true sale will be whatever the parties to the securitization 
transaction say it is.  ABSFA provides that “notwithstanding any other provision 
of law” any property purported, in the transaction documents, to be transferred in 
a securitization transaction "shall be deemed to no longer be the property, assets 
or rights of the transferor."205  The transfer of property by the originator shall, 
under ABSFA, be effective notwithstanding bankruptcy, insolvency or any other 
rights that third parties might assert in the transferred assets.  “A transferor in the 
securitization transaction, its creditors or, in any insolvency proceeding with 
respect to the transferor the transferor’s property, the bankruptcy trustee. . .  shall 
200 In re LTV Steel Company 2001 Bankr. Lexis 131, * 20 (February 5, 2001)(“To suggest that 
Debtor lacks some ownership interest in products that it creates with its own labor, as well as the 
proceeds to be derived from that labor, is difficult to accept. . . . [T]here seems to be an element of 
sophistry to suggest that Debtor does not retain at least an equitable interest” in the cash 
collateral.”). 
201 See, e.g., letter from Bond Market Association Executive Vice President John R. Vogt to 
Senators Patrick Leahy and Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner dated January 30, 2002 
http://www.bondmarket.com/regulatory/ABS013002.pdf, at 2.
202
 S. 220, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001); H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001).  
203 See Lipson, Enron, supra note 13.
204 See Lipson, Enron, supra note 13.
205
 6 DEL CODE § 2703A(a)(1). The Delaware Act goes on to clarify that the "transferor in the 
securitization transactions, its creditors [and any] bankruptcy trustee … shall have no rights, legal 
or equitable, whatsoever to … reclaim … or recharacterize as property of the transferor any 
property, assets or rights purported to be transferred… ." §2703A(2); and that in "the event of a 
bankruptcy, receivership or other insolvency proceeding with respect to the transferor … such 
property, assets and rights shall not be deemed to be part of the transferor’s property, assets, rights 
or estate," § 2703A(3). 
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have no rights, legal or equitable, to reacquire, reclaim . . . or recharacterize as 
property of the transferor any property” transferred in the securitization.206  For 
emphasis, ABSFA further provides that if the transferor enters bankruptcy, the 
transferor’s “property, assets and rights shall not be deemed to be part of the 
transferor’s property, assets, rights or estate.”207
For purposes of the problem of secret liens, the critical language in ABSFA is 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law.”  This presumably means that none 
of the rules in Article 9, or any other state commercial finance statutes, apply if 
property is conveyed in a “securitization” (a term pointedly not defined by the 
statute).  To the extent that Article 9 would otherwise require that a securitization 
transaction be made verifiable by the filing of a UCC-1 financing statement, 
ABSFA is an exception.  ABSFA requires no notice to render a sale effective, and 
displaces any competing law.
A quick response may be that, as noted above, Article 9 contemplates a 
growing number of transactions in which property transfers can be effective 
without notice filing.  Security interests in a wide variety of assets – deposit 
accounts and investment property – can be perfected by control.  A sale of 
payment intangibles is perfected automatically, and thus does not require the 
filing of a financing statement.208  To the extent such transactions are even secured 
transactions, they are perfected automatically, when the security interest 
attaches.209  Thus, they would not be publicly verifiable or measurable, even if 
governed by the more traditional Article 9 regime.
The problem is that ABSFA applies not only to financial collateral, but to 
“any property, assets or rights purported to be transferred, in whole or in part."210
Had it applied to the securitizations in LTV, for example, it would have validated 
even the transactions involving inventory, obviously not assets typically sold or 
encumbered in commercial finance transactions.211  A similar result might obtain 
in Enron.212  Indeed, read literally, ABSFA should authorize intentional 
fraudulent transfers, since it trumps any competing state law.  ABSFA’s failure to 
define a qualifying transaction is equally troubling.  ABSFA guarantees true sale 
treatment “to the extent set forth in the transaction documents.”213  Thus, a 
transfer of property can be effected solely by contract, whether or not the 
transaction bears any resemblance to the common securitization.  Any secret lien 
206
 6 DEL CODE § 2703A(a)(2)
207
 6 DEL CODE § 2703A(a)(3).
208
 U.C.C. § 9-309(2), (3).
209
 Id.
210
 6 DEL CODE § 2703A(a)(1) (emphasis supplied).
211 Compare Plank, supra note [].
212 See Lipson Enron, supra note 13.
213
 6 DEL CODE. § 2703A(a).
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will be effective under Delaware law, so long as “set forth in the transaction 
documents.”214
ABSFA would appear to envision a world in which any property transfer is 
enforceable, whether or not secret, so long as the transaction documents contain 
the magic statutory incantation.  Notice-filing under ABSFA would appear to be 
entirely optional.  Indeed, it may be counterproductive.  In order to discover that a 
debtor has already sold its assets in a securitization, a potential purchaser or 
secured party could never rely on a clean lien search.  The possibility that a debtor 
may, in secret, have engaged in a qualifying transaction under ABSFA means that 
there is simply no way other than contract and diligence – and hope – to know 
that one is in fact acquiring clean title to, or priority in, the debtor’s property.  
ABSFA contains no exception for fraud or mistake.215
The three classes of secret liens described in this section challenge the basic 
intuition that property rights come with corresponding notice obligations.  These 
liens are, in theory, discoverable, but only at what appears to be a prohibitively 
high cost.  These liens are inconsistent with a neoclassical vision of property 
forms that are (or should be) cheaply and readily identifiable, in themselves.  It is 
also inconsistent with the historical tendency to use notice to provide information 
or control in the absence of more rigorous community structures.  It is, 
nevertheless, where we are.
III. How Did We Get Here?
Why are we increasingly tolerant of secret liens?  In simple terms, because we 
have become convinced that notice-filing is economically unsound.  The benefits 
of notice-filing, we are told, do not justify the costs.  
A. The Economic Analysis of Commercial Finance Law
In order to set the table, it might be useful to explain what is meant by 
economic analysis, and why it matters to commercial finance law.  As virtually 
every breathing academic knows, a certain kind of economic analysis of law –
typically associated with the University of Chicago and its eminence grise, 
Ronald Coase – has altered the way we approach most categories of private law, 
from anti-trust to bankruptcy.216  Commercial finance law – and in particular, the 
214
 Id.
215
 There are, of course, ways that a bankruptcy trustee or disappointed purchaser or secured party 
could try to get around ABSFA.   They could argue, among other things, that based on choice-of-
law principles, Delaware law did not apply; that the transaction was not a “securitization” 
(however defined); or (in the case of bankruptcy) that federal law preempts.
216 See Richard A. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future, 64 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1167 (1997) (“The magnitude of the intellectual revolution [of economic analysis] is hard 
to recount today because virtually everyone who works in common law subjects is familiar with 
the now routine exercise of showing why it is, or has to be, the case that this or that common law 
rule is, or is not, efficient.”).  
Coase’s landmark contribution to legal thought appears in R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. Econ 1  (1960), reprinted in R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW, 95 
(Univ. Chicago 1988), an article which has become the "runaway citation champion” among 
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law of secured lending – has not been immune from this trend, whose specific 
roots are generally located in a 1979 Yale Law Journal article by Professors 
Jackson and Kronman which asked a very basic question:  Is secured lending 
efficient? 217
This seductive problem emanates from the Modigliani-Miller invariance 
theory.  Economists Modigliani and Miller famously suggested that in a perfect 
capital market, the value of a firm could not be traced to the organization of its 
capital structure.218  Thus, if a debtor (D) granted a security interest in its assets in 
order to obtain financing from a secured party (SP), other firm investors – in 
particular, shareholders and unsecured creditors – should charge more, reflecting 
the increased risks associated with the security interest.  Whatever D might save 
in reduced interest costs charged by SP should be at least offset by an increased 
rate of interest charged by unsecured creditors.  Firm value – and in particular, the 
cost of capital to the firm – would not vary by virtue of the use of secured 
financing.
The persistence of secured lending puzzled economically-oriented writers 
because, although secured transactions were (and are) far from costless to engage 
in, they should produce an economic wash internally, and may create greater 
social costs through negative externalities.  This is because, among other reasons, 
many creditors – unsophisticated trade creditors, tort creditors, terminated 
employees, taxing authorities, etc – cannot in fact charge higher rates of interest.  
Having not “chosen” to extend credit, these “non-adjusting” creditors could not 
published law review articles. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 
71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 759 (1996) (indicating that Coase's article was cited almost twice as 
often as the next-most-cited law-related article).  Coase had earlier suggested the contours of the 
problem of social cost in R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 
1, 33 (1959)).  
217 Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among 
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979).
218
 Modigliano & Miller, supra note []. Cf. David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured 
Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179, 2219 (1994)(economic analysis of secured lending “emanates from 
a peculiar misunderstanding of the famous Modigliani-Miller model . . . .”).  According to 
Carlson, “[t]he Modigliani-Miller model died in 1976, when Michael Jensen and William 
Meckling pointed out that Modigliani and Miller assumed that corporate structure never changes 
debtor behavior.”  Id. (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 332-33 
(1976)).  Jensen and Meckling identified the problem of agency cost – the cost imposed by the risk 
that X will act, wittingly or not, to the disadvantage of Y.  Jensen and Meckling, supra.  Carlson 
writes as if proponents of the economic approach were ignorant of the contribution of Jensen and 
Meckling.  It is, however, clear that its earliest proponents – Jackson and Kronman – well 
understood their contribution, and the more general problem of agency costs. See Jackson & 
Kronman, supra note [] at 1149 – 1161.
While the Modigliani-Miller theory may have many flaws, it remains an important tool in 
conceptualizing the microeconomics of firm of organization.  Professor Schwarcz, for example, 
purports to have “solved” the puzzle of secured lending, given certain assumptions, using 
Modigliani & Miller. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425, 429 (1997).  
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charge correspondingly higher rates of interest (or otherwise protect themselves 
from loss of recourse to the debtor’s assets).219  Thus, while a secured creditor 
would have access to all of a debtor’s property, those in the most vulnerable 
position would not.  This would, in turn, create perverse managerial incentives to 
disregard risks thus externalized.220  The debtor that gave full priority in its assets 
to a particular secured creditor would have externalized all losses onto those in 
the worst position to protect themselves. 221 Since the transaction costs associated 
with secured lending were presumed greater than the transaction costs associated 
with other methods of financing many academics followed the lead of Jackson 
and Kronman in asking why rational market actors would engage in such 
transactions.  Asking and answer the questions posed by the Modigliani-Miller 
puzzle, as writ small in commercial finance law, became an enormously attractive 
enterprise for legal academics.222
219
 The term “nonadjusting creditors” is generally associated with Bebchuk and Fried, who use it 
in Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1996).  Bebchuk and Fried take the term one step further, 
and apply it to all creditors for whom adjustment may either be costly or implausible, such as 
small-dollar trade creditors, or creditors who extended unsecured credit before the debtor granted 
the security interest.
220
 Bebchuk & Fried supra note [], at 934 (arguing that the rule of full priority “causes excessive 
use of security interests, reduces the incentive of firms to take adequate precautions and choose 
appropriate investments, and distorts the monitoring arrangements chosen by firms and their 
creditors”).  Other contributions to this body of literature are collected in Lipson, Remote Control, 
supra note 120, at 1403, n. 403.
221
 As Bebchuk and Fried explained –
The fact that security interests may be used to transfer value from nonadjusting creditors 
under a full-priority rule means that security interests may be used even when they give rise to 
inefficiencies. As our analysis will demonstrate, the ability to use security interests to divert 
value from nonadjusting creditors tends to distort the borrower's choice of contractual 
arrangements with its creditors, giving rise to certain efficiency costs.
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note [], at 965.
There have been a number of responses which develop reasonably plausible claims that secured 
lending under certain circumstances can be efficient.  See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the 
Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179, 2219 (1994); Homer Kripke, Law and 
Economics:  Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. 
PA. L. REV. 929 (1985); Schwarcz, Easy Case, supra note []; Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle 
of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067 (1989).
222 See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note [], at 1154 & n.46; Schwartz, Current Theories,
supra note [], at 1052-55; Shupack, Solving the Puzzle, supra  note []  A curious feature of the 
economic analysis of commercial finance law – the “puzzle literature” – is its obsession with 
Modigliani and Miller, to the apparent exclusion of other economic concerns. See William W. 
Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 92,124 n.40 ("Oddly, the irrelevance hypothesis has had a stranglehold on commercial-law 
theory.").  There is, as David Gray Carlson and others have observed, more to the economic story 
than simply a price-theory explanation of firm capitalization. Carlson, Efficiency, supra note [] 
2198, 2211 (summarizing critiques); see also Warner, Antibankruptcy Act, supra note [], at 12 
(“although the economic analysis is useful in analyzing questions of allocative efficiency, it does 
not provide much insight into questions of distributive efficiency”).
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B. Economic Theories of Notice-Filing
Economic analysis of commercial finance transactions expanded beyond this 
foundational puzzle, to take on various attributes of these transactions, including 
notice filing.  Intuitively, we might think that notice-filing is an efficient method 
of conveying information about property, especially to those outside of the 
debtor’s immediate community.  Yet this is not how our thinking has developed.
1. Revenue Theory
The crudest argument against notice-filing involves the upfront, direct costs of 
the systems:  namely, that these systems are covert sources of revenue for the 
government.  There are many who view all schemes to require the recordation of 
interests in personal property as little more than state confiscation.223  This is 
because most such regimes require the payment of a filing fee when the interest is 
recorded.  Professor Bowers, for example, has characterized the filing system 
under Article 9 as “little more than a rip-off”224 because “[t]he market for 
information could probably efficaciously do whatever the filing system 
bureaucracies do and at a lesser aggregate resource cost.”225  On this view, the 
UCC-1 system is simply the worst form of rent-seeking, plagued by incompetent 
and indifferent bureaucrats who happen to the brothers-in-law of politicians, or 
obligees of political favors.  
There is no question that these systems are important sources of revenue for 
the states and localities that maintain them, and this has long been true.226  Some 
of the earliest recordation statutes were enacted largely (if not wholly) on the 
theory that they would feed the public fisc.  One of the earlier recording statutes, 
the Statute for the Enrollment of Bargains and Sales promulgated under Henry 
VIII, requiring the recordation of transfers of title to real property, was allegedly 
intended as a revenue statute.227  Professor Mooney has indicated that the same 
can be said of the first fraudulent conveyance statute, the Statute of 13 Elizabeth.  
This statute provided that transfers with the 'intent [ ] to delay, hinder or defraud 
creditors and others' were void, and provided for recovery of the 'whole value of . 
223 See Alces, Abolish Filing, supra note [], at 680.  See also Peter A. Alces & Robert M. Lloyd, 
An Agenda for Reform of the Article 9 Filing System, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 99 (1991)(the UCC-1 
system is “the very foundation of the personal property security law in the United States.”) 
(footnote omitted); Bowers, supra  note [].
224 See Bowers, supra  note [], at 724.
225 See Bowers, supra note [], at 725.  Bowers argues both that notice-filing itself is little more 
than a tax on secured lending (id., at 733 (“The filing system consequently operates as if it were a 
tax on secured transactions”)) and that, if any notice system were appropriate, the market would 
better provide this information than the government.  Id. at 734 (“A properly privatized system, 
for example, encourages those who own the system to adopt any advantageous technologies, 
without a legislative mandate.”)
226
 Paul M. Shupack, On Boundaries and Definitions:  A Commentary on Dean Baird, 80 VA. L. 
REV. 2273, 2273 n.1 (1994) (indicating that under former Article 9, UCC-1 filing system produced 
net gain to states of between $300,000,000 and $400,000,000 annually).
227 See Bowers, supra note [], at 731-32 (citing 27 Hen. VIII, c. 16 (1535)).  
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. . goods and chattels' transferred, to be shared by the Crown and aggrieved parties 
(such as creditors), and provided for criminal sanctions against the parties to the 
transfer.228  The statute was, according to Mooney, “intended in large part as a 
revenue measure.”229
To characterize filing as a deal tax is, of course, to stigmatize it.  Most 
commercial lawyers view taxes suspiciously, regardless of the value one might 
ascribe to good government.  Yet the proper question is not whether filing 
imposes costs– it imposes many – but whether it is worth the price paid.  It is easy 
to imagine facts in which filing may be economically optimal, or perform other 
socially useful functions.   It is just as easy to model facts in which filing fails to 
satisfy these (or similar) criteria.  
In any case, sub rosa taxation cannot be a complete explanation for the rise 
and persistence of public notice systems.  First, if raising revenue were the only or 
most important goal of filing systems, one would expect that legislatures would 
never enact the revisions to Article 9 or the securitization facilitation acts, all of 
which tend to reduce or eliminate the obligation to file (revenue generating) 
notice in commercial finance transactions.  Indeed, one of the reasons Article 9 is 
viewed as a triumph of efficiency is the fact that it reduced the obligation to file 
financing statements in multiple states or on a county-by- county basis (often 
required under former law) – which necessarily reduce aggregate revenue to the 
state filing authorities.230
Second, and perhaps more important, there are as discussed below, a number 
of plausible substantive rationales for requiring public recordation of security 
interests.  It is difficult to imagine that legislatures are able to enact covert 
revenue regimes without any supporting principle.  These rationales may have 
more and less force, but they suggest that raising revenue alone cannot explain 
why public notice is adjunct to certain types of property transfers.
2. Rational Apathy – Charlie Don’t Surf
A second argument against notice-filing focuses on the benefit side of the 
equation, and argues that few actually care about notice-filing – especially those 
228
 13 ELIZ., CH. 5 (1570).  
229 See Mooney, Myth, supra note 68, at 726, n 162 (citing 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§  61b, 61c, at 89-93 (rev. ed. 1940)).  
230
 As discussed above, prior law – including earlier iterations of Article 9 -- were generally 
viewed as having required more filings in more offices than revised Article 9.  This is partly 
because former Article 9’s choice of law rules were organized around the physical location of the 
debtor, rather than the state in which the debtor was incorporated.  Under former Article 9, a 
security interest could be perfected by filing in [the debtor’s principal place of business, which 
was often a difficult factual determination to make].  The prudent course of action under prior law 
was therefore to file everywhere the debtor might have been doing business.  Revised §§ 9-301 & 
307, by contrast, provide that, for debtors that are “registered organizations” – corporations, LLCs, 
etc – the only place to file is the state in which the debtor was formed (e.g., the state of formation 
under applicable corporate law)   Similarly, former law occasionally required that financing 
statements be filed not only at the state level, but also by county.   See U.C.C. § 9-401 (2000).  
The End of Notice Page 48 of 74 
 
C:\inetpub\ wwwroot\results\4381-text.native.1091721321.doc; 8/5/2004 11:50 AM
historically characterized as its principal beneficiaries: unsecured trade creditors.  
Except for actual or potential secured creditors – those who formally “rely” on the 
debtor’s property -- the general population of creditors is apathetic to the 
information provided by the notice-filing system – and rationally so.
Professor White, for example, has argued that the presumed audience for 
financing-statement information could, in fact, care less:
Neither the plumber, carpenter, accountant, Commonwealth Edison nor any 
other thousands of general creditors check the files to determine who has a 
financing statement on file before it decides whether it will extend unsecured 
credit in the form of the sale of goods or services.  In the words of the trade, 
these are "non- reliance creditors" and are not entitled to protection of a lack 
of filing because they would not rely on it in any case.231
Baird similarly claims that “the notice-filing system of Article 9 provides virtually 
no assistance to unsecured creditors.  Parties without ownership interests in the 
debtor’s property rarely check the filing system, and if they do, they rarely learn 
anything.”232
Lynn LoPucki has offered a slightly more systemic gloss, arguing that 
unsecured creditors often do little more than “cash-flow surf.”233  Cash-flow 
surfing happens when unsecured creditors make small, short-term extensions of 
credit, hoping against hope that the debtor will be able to pay the debt from cash 
flow in the ordinary course.234  These creditors may reason that the debtor’s assets 
are already fully encumbered, or that they are worth nothing, or that it is simply 
not worth making a credit decision based on such complex analyses.  Apathy to 
the information produced by the system is rational, because learning about what is 
out there costs more than it’s worth.  The unsecured creditor expects to be repaid 
not because it relies on the value of any particular assets, but as the result of “a 
combination of nonlegal pressures on the debtor.”235  And the involuntary creditor 
231 See White, Wasteful Litigation, at 827.  Baird makes a similar claim.  See Baird, Ostensible 
Ownership, supra note 19, at 66-67 (“the Code’s notice-filing system addresses principally only 
one kind of ostensible ownership problem – the one arising from competition between secured 
creditors.”). 
232 See Baird, Ostensible Ownership, supra note 19,  at 55.
233 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1923 &1938-
39 (1994) [hereinafter, LoPucki, Creditor’s Bargain].
234
 Id. at 1924.
235
 LoPucki, Creditor’s Bargain, supra note [], at 1941. This is not to say that verification has no 
role in the world of cash-flow surfing.  LoPucki argues, however, that monitoring will occur not 
by virtue of the UCC financing statement system, but instead through informal communications 
about the debtor’s financial condition: 
[I]f the debtor does not seasonably pay its unsecured creditors, that fact will be transmitted 
through credit reporting and other information channels to the debtor's secured creditors, 
employees, suppliers, customers and other trading partners.  If the reports get bad enough, 
others will refuse to deal and the debtor will be unable to remain in business.  In this 
conception, unsecured debt is likely to be short term and restricted to amounts that are small 
in relation to the creditor's portfolio. The unsecured creditor monitors the debtor through 
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– the tort claimant or terminated employee – is certainly not going to care much, 
ex ante, about what the public record says about nonpossessory interests in the 
debtor’s property.  Having not chosen to extend credit, involuntary (“non-
adjusting”) creditors can hardly be said to have relied on a debtor’s assets.236
Those who assert a general indifference to filed notice are often quick to 
distinguish between two hypothetical audiences.  While trade and other “simple” 
creditors will not consult the record, other more sophisticated creditors – in 
particular, secured creditors -- will.237  The claim is thus not that the notice-filing 
system should be dismantled entirely, only that it should not be geared to an 
audience that does not use it.238  Notice should matter only to “reliance” creditors, 
who are presumed to be those who have taken security (or similar) interests in a 
debtor’s property.239
Professor Baird has thus argued that “general creditors rely only in part on the 
debtor’s assets when extending credit. General creditors base their decision to 
lend on the debtor’s general financial health, of which a present or potential 
encumbrance of the debtor’s property is only one factor.”240  Moreover, he claims, 
“[c]ases in which creditors decide to lend because of their mistaken belief that an 
asset is unencumbered are rare.”241  Thus, he concludes, “[t]he needs of general 
credit reports and other sources of information and evaluates the risk that the business will be 
discontinued.  The unsecured credit will be short term because the extender's recourse, in the 
event it deems the risk too great, is to withdraw.  The unsecured creditor will have the 
leverage to withdraw only so long as the debtor continues to value its reputation for payment.  
If the business closes, it is usually a foregone conclusion that the unsecured debt will not be 
repaid.
Id. at 1941 (footnotes omitted).
236 Nor is this a new claim. Professor Gilmore, a reporter for Article 9, has observed that some of 
the drafters suggested that no one – not even lenders – truly relied on the pre-Code notice filing 
systems.  Rather, the decision to extend credit was based “not on public records, but on financial 
statements – balance sheets and profit and loss statements.”  Gilmore, supra note [], at § 15.1, p. 
463. In his view, the “[p]ublic files . . . will be rarely consulted.”
237 See sources cited in note [], supra.
238 See  citations at note [] supra.
239
 As Douglas Baird argues
[T]he notice-filing system of Article 9 provides virtually no assistance to unsecured 
creditors.  Parties without ownership interests in the debtor’s property rarely check the filing 
system, and if they do, they rarely learn anything.  Article 9's filing system principally 
serves the interests of secured creditors. ...A notice-filing system... sorts out property claims 
among those who have or seek property claims; its function is not to give the world at large 
notice of security interests.”  
Baird, Ostensible Ownership, supra note [], at 55.
240
 Id. at 60.
241
 Id. at 60.
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creditors neither justify the costs of the present filing system nor explain its 
contours.”242
Arguments against notice-filing based on claims about who does (or does not) 
rely on it are curious and troublesome, for at least three reasons.  First, these are 
often empirical claims about actual behavior, in the real world.  As such it would 
seem possible to test them.  These claims have not, to date, been tested, at least in 
any rigorous and public way.  Were we, as some have argued, to abolish a system 
supported by deep intuition and hundreds of years of practice, we might wish to 
know a little bit about who might be affected by the change, and how.
Second, there is reasonably good anecdotal evidence that many beyond 
traditional lenders use the system, and for a variety of purposes.  In certain 
transactions, parties may use these systems as bulletin boards to ward off those 
who might try to take an interest in the debtor’s property, even though the filers 
themselves have no such interest. Edwin Smith, a leading practitioner, has 
indicated that a lender benefiting from a “negative pledge” might file a financing 
statement, even though such a transaction would not necessarily result in the 
staking of a claim by the lender.243
Paul Shupack has suggested that in certain contexts, trade creditors rely on a 
clean record in deciding whether to ship to a debtor who has promised not to 
encumber its inventory.244  Trade creditors might, Shupack suggests, “view the 
debtor’s use of inventory as security as a public statement of the debtor’s financial 
distress, particularly if the debtor had not previously done so.”245  Others have 
suggested that equipment lenders would “trawl” the financing statement records, 
242
 Id. at 62.  
243 Smith explains --
I have seen this technique used on various occasions for negative pledge agreements and 
subordination agreements.  In the case of a negative pledge agreement, of course, it is in the 
interest of the creditor in whose favor the negative pledge is granted to put other creditors on 
notice of the existence of a negative pledge.  In the case of a lender filing a subordination, it is 
in the interest of the debtor to provide comfort to a new senior creditor extending credit to the 
debtor that the senior creditor will in fact be senior.  Although neither example fits squarely 
into the original purposes of the Article 9 filing system, it seems to me that the commercial 
"bulletin board" approach, by providing even additional information about the debtor than that 
required by the Article 9 filing system, is useful.  And, as the examples indicate, can benefit
either the creditor or the debtor depending on the particular circumstances. See Alces, supra
note [], at 696. (quoting letter from Edwin E. Smith, Bingham, Dana & Gould, to Professor 
Peter A. Alces, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary 1-2 (July 
31, 1991)).
244
 Paul M. Shupack, Preferred Capital Structures and the Question of Filing, 79 MINN. L. REV. 
787, 803-807 (1995)
245
 Id. at 806.  This makes sense only if the trade creditors do not understand purchase-money 
priority, or rationally conclude (for any number of reasons) that the mechanics involved in 
obtaining that “super” priority are not worth the effort.  Shupack suggests that certain trade 
creditors may not find purchase money priority attractive because, among other things, “these 
sellers have a visceral feeling that the inventory should be ‘theirs’ because they supplied it . . . .”  
Id. at 805.
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looking for financing statements that were about to expire.  Reasoning that the 
loans covered by the financing statements were about to expire, they might then 
contact the debtors indicated in those financing statements, in order to “sell” 
replacement financing.246  Professor Carlson has argued that  the notice-filing 
system performed a kind of antitrust function, preventing local lenders from 
gaining a strangle-hold on borrowers, to the exclusion of national lenders.247
Third, and perhaps most important from a policy perspective, there are 
reasons other than current actual usage for the filing.  While some of these include 
the communal and behavioral effects of notice-filing, discussed in part IV, infra, it 
would seem axiomatic that many public systems perform important but indirect 
functions.  Even if non-bank creditors do not perform UCC-1 searches, they may 
consult credit reporting services like Dun & Bradstreet.  These services provide 
(or attempt to provide) analyses of companies as to such matters as timeliness of 
payment, credit history, and so on.  One component of the Dun and Bradstreet 
analysis would appear to be an assessment of publicly recorded interests in the 
debtor’s property, such as UCC-1 financing statements and judgment liens.248
Thus, even if most unsecured creditors do not directly rely on the public record, 
the services upon which they rely for this information may.249  Notice-filing may 
246 See email from Howard Ruda, attorney, to author, July 21, 2003 (“There was a time (and 
perhaps still is) when UCC (and predecessor) records were searched for marketing information”) 
(on file with author).
247
 Professor Carlson explains:
By providing information to the national credit market, Article 9 filing improves competition 
in the credit market generally.  Thieves are deprived of their economic rents, and creditors are 
prevented from pocketing the savings.  This is an ethically attractive program from many 
perspectives, but, once again, it is arbitrary and meaningless to a welfare economist.  No a 
priori conclusions for welfare economics can be drawn from what has been said.  All that can 
be said clearly is that Article 9 redistributes wealth from one class to another.  These 
redistributions will probably affect prices – although this too is an empirical matter – but 
merely changing prices cannot be viewed as a priori good or bad.   
Again, the rationale for public access to Article 9 filing information is that the system 
socialized a useful screening function, thus depriving local creditors of an advantage over 
national creditors.  But this rationale presumes a context that may no longer be empirically 
correct.  For example, where it is generally known that assets are always encumbered by 
security interests, a filing system may simply cost too much, as many now allege.  In these 
contexts, filing systems might violate the logic upon which they are founded, in which case 
reform is in order. 
Carlson, Debt Collection, at 831.
248
 https://www.dnb.com/product/ebir_publicfilings.htm
249
 The full force of Dun & Bradstreet services as a verification and measurement system were 
recently on display in In re Communication Dynamics, Inc., 300 B.R. 220 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).  
There, the bankruptcy court for the District of Delaware concluded that the review of a Dun & 
Bradstreet report was sufficient “notification” of the assignment of a claim to defeat a right of 
setoff, as provided in U.C.C. § 9-404(a), which limits an account debtor’s right to setoff against an 
account if the debtor has assigned the account, and the account debtor has notice of it.  The
account debtor in Communication Dynamics was deemed to have notice of the assignment its 
account because credit officer for the account debtor had obtained a Dunn & Bradstreet report 
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provide part of the informational foundation on which these systems are built 
because all creditors may indirectly rely on it for information about credit 
decisions.
3. Redistribution Theory
Perhaps the greatest reason to challenge the view that creditors are apathetic is 
that it is disingenuous.  That is, the real concern of those who grouse about the 
notice-filing system is not that creditors ignore it, but that the penalty for failing 
to comply with it is excessive.  As discussed above, this penalty derives from the 
“strong-arm” power of Bankruptcy Code § 544(a), which provides that the 
bankruptcy trustee “shall have . . . the rights and powers of, or may avoid any 
transfer of property of the debtor . . . that is voidable by—(1) a creditor that . . . 
obtains . . . a judicial lien” on the property in question.250  As noted above, this 
power has often been used arbitrarily, in the sense that a lender might lose its lien 
even though there was in fact no real information failure.  Thus, Professor Bowers 
writes, “[t]here is good reason to believe that bankruptcy legislation is intended 
mainly to chisel secured creditors out of their bargains.”251  Notice filing has 
about the debtor (the account debtor’s creditor) indicating that a secured party had a lien on the 
debtor’s accounts receivable:
[Account debtor] T & B argues that it did not receive an authenticated notice because third 
party private information providers, such as D & B, are not substitutes for the affirmative acts 
of signing or executing required of the assignee/assignor.  The Debtor responds that a writing 
transmitted directly from a debtor or a secured party to an account debtor is not required to 
satisfy the authentication requirement of the statute. . . . Using this analysis, we conclude that 
the delivery of the D & B report to T & B, which included a statement that the Lenders had a 
lien in all accounts receivable, meets this requirement.  Such reports are often relied upon by 
parties in determining whether such liens exist.  In fact, Mr. Burks testified that T & B does 
rely on D & B's comprehensive reports for information about its customers.  Therefore, we 
conclude that, having received authenticated notice of the Lenders' liens on May 1, 2002, T & 
B's right to setoff does not have priority over the Lenders' liens under section 9-404 of the 
UCC.
Id. at 224- 225.
I note parenthetically that the Communications Dynamics opinion would appear to have erred 
in its interpretation of section 9-404(a)(1).  That section provides that the rights of an assignee 
(e.g., a secured party) are “subject to . . . (2) any other defense o claim of the account debtor 
against the assignor [debtor] which accrues before the account debtor receives a notification of the 
assignment authenticated by the assignor or the assignee.”  While the Communications Dynamics
court discusses the meaning of the term “authentication” (300 B.R. at 225), it failed to recognize 
that a D&B report is not authenticated by the debtor.  The mistake may have been in the court’s 
assumption that financing statements are signed by debtors.  Id. (“we do not go so far as T&B in 
concluding that [U.C.C. § 9-404(a)] means actual delivery of a signed copy of the financing 
statement . . . .”).  Despite this obvious mistake, the court ultimately came to the correct result, 
recognizing that the account debtor retained a right of recoupment under U.C.C. § 9-404(a)(1) 
regardless of the notice that it did (or did not) have.
250 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1).
251 Id.
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existed “mostly [as] insurance against bankruptcy”252 or as a “bankruptcy tax” on 
secured transactions.253
There is no question that the strong-arm power to redistribute wealth imposes 
costs on certain parties.  The important question, however, is whether the costs 
imposed by the strong-arm power exceed the benefits that might flow from 
compliance with the notice-filing rules.  I think here the balance sheet becomes 
difficult to assess, especially where there has in fact been no secret lien.  Where 
the community of creditors knows or has reason to know that a debtor’s property 
is encumbered, it is difficult to see the efficiencies that would result from ex post 
avoidance on purely technical grounds.  By definition, cognizant creditors would 
have chosen to extend credit informed of the economic risks that the secured party 
had priority; it is not clear how society benefits economically if these creditors 
were not required to internalize these risks (because a court later avoids the 
security interest for technical reasons not apparent or relevant to the parties).
Conversely, where a secured party or other investor has priority in the 
debtor’s assets that it is not known, the more formal attributes of the notice-filing 
system become important, for the same basic reasons.  Voluntary creditors that 
extend credit based on significant information asymmetries – who do not know 
the data or intellectual property is encumbered, and have no realistic way to find 
out – are being forced to transfer value to secured creditors who should have no 
rational incentive to make their property interests known.  This is because the 
holder of the secret lien should want its debtor to acquire as much property as 
possible from creditors who would not otherwise choose to lend or sell on credit if 
they knew their true economic risks. 
In any case, what is clear, and what will be developed in part IV, is that 
observations about community, and the role that information plays in 
communities, provide important lessons on the role of both notice-filing system 
and the strong-arm power, which may help cure distortions in both.
4. Economic Theory – Signaling and Priority
Arguments about the ex post redistribution of a debtor’s property are not 
limited to the problem of notice-filing.  Rather, questions about balancing the 
rights of pre-bankruptcy entitlement holders (e.g., secured creditors) against those 
of other claimants (e.g., unsecured creditors) are fundamental to bankruptcy and 
commercial finance policy.254 Because, as noted at the outset of this part of the 
252 See White, supra note [], at 531.  This statement is a bit tendentious, because filing is insurance 
only against one form of loss – due to the strong-arm power.  But secured creditors lose their 
collateral – or its value – all the time.  The ordinary course rules expressly contemplate the loss of 
rights in collateral by “cutting off” security interests when there has been a complying (e.g., 
“ordinary course”) disposition.  UCC §§ 9-320 & 9-321.  Similarly, the security interest itself is 
worth only as much as the underlying property.  While collateral  itself may insure against the risk 
that  the debtor will not have sufficient unencumbered assets to service the debt, there is little 
about filing that “insures” the value of the security interest.
253 See Bowers, supra note [], at 733.
254See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987).
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article, it has been so difficult to develop a satisfactory explanation of the 
persistence of secured credit on traditional price theory, a number of economically 
oriented writers suggested that the real virtue of secured credit lay in the 
informational value of these, as distinct from other, financing transactions.  
Varieties of this theory appear in the work of, among others, Thomas Jackson 
& Anthony Kronman,255 Frank Buckley,256 Alan Schwartz,257 Barry Adler,258 Saul 
Levmore,259 and George Triantis.260  All have suggested that secured credit plays 
an important part in solving information asymmetries among a debtor and its 
various constituents and, implicitly, that information may play some role in 
assessing the efficiency of secured lending.261   As Professor Triantis has 
explained “[t]here is little doubt that when a firm secures a larger portion of its 
debt than similarly situated firms it communicates information of some sort to the 
market.”262
(a) Signaling 
Alan Schwartz initially suggested (but later rejected) the idea that a security 
interest would be a kind of “signal.”263  Schwartz reasoned that a security interest 
might be such a signal because it would “restrict future borrowing opportunities, 
255
 Jackson & Kronman, supra note []. 
256
 Frank H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1393 (1986).
257 See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:  A Review of Current 
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,  15 (1981)[hereinafter, Schwartz, Review] (“A firm willing to 
encumber its assets is, thus, “signaling” that, in its view, its prospects justify” the costs of secured 
credit).  See also Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. Legal Stud. 209 
(1989)[hereinafter, “Schwartz, Theory”]; Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in 
Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1396 (1997).
258
 Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 73 (1993).
259
 Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J.
49 (1982).
260
 George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 225 (1992).
261
 Information asymmetries arise whenever one party to a transaction possesses superior 
information.  See also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of 
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 698 (1986); 
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 
549, 595 n.134 (1984) ("The difficulty of assuring oneself of the value of purchased information 
has been recognized for some time.").
262
 Triantis, supra note [], at 255.
263
 Professor Buckley developed a related view that secured  lending performs a “screening” 
function.  See Buckley supra note [].  Buckley observed that if a debtor had only unsecured 
creditors, lenders would have to examine a debtor carefully to determine its liquidation value in a 
bankruptcy.  This would be costly  because, among other reasons, that would have to know of one 
another’s claims.  Inserting a secured creditor into the mix, however, would reduce the screening 
costs of unsecured creditors, because  they would assume that they would recover nothing if the 
debtor liquidated.  Id. at 1424 (where unsecured creditors assume that they recover nothing in 
bankruptcy, the “need not estimate how many other claims will be made on bankruptcy.”).  
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give secured creditors greater leverage over firm behavior, and make it more 
difficult for a firm to reschedule debts in the event of hard times.”264  A security 
interest is an efficient signal to the world that the firms believes that its prospects 
justify these costs.265  “The apparent property of a secured debt to communicate 
accurately to creditors a firm’s true estimate of its expected earnings indicates that 
the existence of secured debt may be explained as a signaling phenomenon.”266
Secured lending may thus be “a way” for debtors to “sort[] themselves out by risk 
class.”267
Schwartz nevertheless had doubts about the signaling explanation.  First, he 
correctly observed that the strength of the signaling explanation depended on the 
knowledge that other creditors have of the risk preferences of the owners and 
managers of the debtor.268  But there is no particular reason to imagine that 
creditors will know this, or that such information is necessarily cheap and easy to 
obtain.  Second, the signal may itself be ambiguous as to the quality of firm 
projects.  If so, these informational ambiguities would infect the equilibrium 
obtained from viewing security interests as signals.  The signal-to-noise ratio may 
not, in general, be great enough to justify the externalities created by secured 
lending.269
(b) Contractual Priority 
For purposes of this paper, Schwartz’s principal contribution on the 
information costs of secured lending appears in a 1989 article in which he argued 
that notice-filing had little value as a means of verifying and measuring property 
interests in commercial finance transactions, at least so far as other creditors 
might be concerned.  This followed from his view of the capital structure that 
rational parties would choose ex ante.  Schwartz surmised that such parties would, 
absent legal intervention, choose highly rigid capital structures, which would 
always give the first lender priority in the debtor’s assets (subject to a limited 
purchase-money carveout), whether or not the parties characterized the loan as 
being secured.270
Schwartz began his analysis by surveying form books and practitioner guides, 
which indicate that lenders often ask borrowers to agree to restrictive covenants 
that forbid later borrowing, subject to certain agreed-to exceptions for, e.g.,  
264
 Id. at 15.
265
 Id.
266
 Id. 
267
 Id. at 17
268
 Id. at 17-18.
269
 Id. at 18 (“If a security-interest signal . . . actually tells creditors little about the riskiness of 
firm projects, too much signaling could occur in equilibrium; the total costs that firms incur in 
sending signals will exceed the total social gain generated by more appropriate credit 
extensions.”).
270 See Schwartz, Theory supra note [], at 213 (“The UCC should give initial financers first 
priority, whether or not they are secured, except for a reduced purchase-money priority.”).  
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ordinary course trade debt.271  From the existence of these covenants, Schwartz 
concluded that the “optimal contract” would give first financers priority over all 
(or most) later non-ordinary course lenders.272  That is, the law should recognize 
what he called a “true first in time (FT)” rule, “which confers senior rank on the 
initial financer who just enters into the loan contract.”273  The problem with such a 
system, Schwartz observed, was informational:  How would later creditors learn 
that the earlier creditor had priority?  How, in other words, would later creditors 
verify and measure other interests affecting the debtor’s property?274
Schwartz argued that in a true FT system, later creditors would learn of prior 
interests because debtors would want to inform them.  Schwartz reasoned that 
“sensibly conservative” lenders would assume that all or most debtors are “bad,” 
and should therefore pay a high rate of interest.275  Truly “good” debtors – those 
that should receive a low rate of interest – would therefore have an incentive to 
distinguish themselves.  “Good debtors,” Schwartz suggested, “could avoid 
paying the high interest rates that uninformed lenders would charge by informing 
the lenders that they had little or no prior debt.”276  The “key question,” Schwartz 
observed, was whether borrowers could “make credible communications of their 
debt status at acceptable cost.”277  He also observed that firms that borrow take the 
interest cost deduction.  A simple review of any given borrower’s income tax 
return would therefore reveal the existence significant prior debt.278  Moreover, to 
the extent that a debtor was required to report under federal securities law, 
material indebtedness would likely be reported.279  In any case, he argued, 
[B]ecause private disclosure seems both cheap and common, there is no good 
case for retaining current law on the sole ground that implementing a new 
271
 Schwartz, Theory, supra note [], at 216-18.
272
 Id. at 218-19.
273
 Id. at 219.
274
 “The question is whether to adopt a true FT rule and thereby permit parties to create secret liens 
or to incur the expense of a new filing regime.”  Id. at 219 (footnote omitted).  
275
 Id. at 220.
276
 Id. at 220.
277
 Id. at 220.  He was thus not concerned with demarcating priority clearly, as might happen with 
a notice-filing system.  “A true FT system probably would date priority from when the initial loan 
contract was legally effective.  This almost always will be when it is signed.”  Id. at 222-223, n. 
24.  This is a curious claim for a number of reasons.  First, loan agreements are typically effective 
only for certain purposes at the time they are signed (or otherwise executed) by the parties.  The 
lender, for example, typically retains the right to decline to fund the loan until a number of 
conditions precedent are satisfied.  Should priority then date to the time of the closing or 
signature?  Second, in revolving loans, it is difficult to know from time to time how much is owed 
on a given loan.  A subsequent lender would have some difficulty in determining how much – if 
any – property of a debtor would be available in the event of a default.  Indeed, given the first 
lender’s permanent priority, a subsequent lender should never arise, because it would always be at 
risk of being “primed” by subsequent advances from the first lender.
278
 Id. at 220-21.
279
 Id. at 221.
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priority scheme would prohibitively increase the necessary costs of notifying 
creditors of the existence of prior claims in a borrower’s property. . . . . The 
expense to the parties of observing the borrower’s books, which is the primary 
marginal cost of a true [first in time] rule, seems cheaper than the costs of a 
new public system.”280
It is not clear how a notice-filing regime would work in a system with a true 
FT rule.  On the one hand, Schwartz seems to believe that a true FT rule could 
peacefully coexist with the extant notice-filing regimes.281  While notice-filing 
may no longer be necessary vis a vis other creditors, it would, on his view, 
continue to perform an important function as to buyers of a debtor’s assets.282
Indeed, it could even persist as to creditors, although it would not likely have 
much value.283  On the other hand, it is not clear why creditors would bother to 
take security in a world in which it was always possible (and perhaps probable) 
that the debtor had a true FT creditor who would trump the (later) secured party.284
In a world with a true FT rule, secured creditors would be few and far between.
Schwartz recognized that a true FT rule has the potential to create a secret lien 
problem.  If a true FT creditor always trumps later firm investors, later firm 
investors will always run the risk that the debtor has concealed the existence of 
such a creditor.  Although Schwartz does not speak of the true FT system as if it 
created liens, it would nevertheless have the potential to create the functional 
equivalent.  There would be potential, undisclosed prior interests in a debtor’s 
property that would have to verified and measured in order to make a rational 
credit (or other investment) decision.
Schwartz argued that a true FT system would not, in fact, create a secret lien 
problem because borrowers would, in the aggregate, choose to disclose accurately 
and honestly the existence of a true FT lender.  First, “borrowers know that to 
commit fraud would require them to sustain credible lies against skilled inquirers 
280
 Id. at 222.
281
 Id. at 223 (“The conclusion that a true FT rule is preferable to creating a new filing system does 
not imply that the existing filing system should be abolished.”)
282
 Id. (“Consequently, the FT rule should apply only to creditor disputes, and the filing system 
should be retained to regulate conflicts between financers and later buyers.”).
283
 Id. at 223-24 (“A [] reason to retain the filing system is that filing has been considered a 
necessary condition to the perfection of security interests. There is no good reason to ban security 
interests . . . .”)
284
 The practical problems of such a system would be considerable.  If a debtor had a true FT 
creditor, its effective interest in the debtor’s property would correspond to the amount of credit 
extended, which would presumably be an amount that could vary over time, as the creditor made 
subsequent advances, as interest and other costs accrued, and as the debtor made principal and 
interest payments.  If a later creditor sought to take a security interest in an item of equipment it 
was selling to the debtor, it could never know for certain that the true FT would not made a 
subsequent advance that effectively primed the secured party.  Nor is it clear how common 
corporate transactions would affect the analysis.  If two debtors, each with a true FT lender, sought 
to merge, what rule would determine the priority of the lenders?   The same problem would obtain 
if a debtor sold its assets.
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for a considerable period of time,” he suggested.285   Second, he reasoned that 
borrowers want to preserve good will; incorrect disclosures about the existence 
(or not) of a true FT lender would harm the debtor’s reputation.  Third, if the loan 
market were competitive, a separating equilibrium would develop in which the 
pooling rate of interest would tend to price in the assumption that borrowers had 
prior true FT debt.  Truly debt-free borrowers would have an incentive to disclose 
credibly their debt-free status, or risk “punishment” in the form of the higher 
pooling rate.  286  Unless the cost of disclosure were enormous, he reasoned, it 
would be in the interest of borrowers to convey accurately the truth about the 
interests that others had in their property.287
Of the prominent economic writers, Schwartz’s analysis has the virtue of 
being most forthright about its contempt for notice-filing, and its indifference to 
the problem of secret liens.  Schwartz’s position suffers, however, from the 
optimism that tends to afflict much hard economic analysis of commercial  
finance law.  There is simply no reason to believe that debtors and creditors 
would behave in the ways that he predicts in a true FT system.  If nothing else, 
recent corporate scandals suggest that very sophisticated people can make serious 
mistakes about the real value of complex firms.  People can – and apparently will 
-- use this complexity to conceal true firm value.  It has not been demonstrated 
that a true FT system would address and modify such behavior.
Economic analysis of this sort is no longer cutting edge.288  Much of the “low 
hanging fruit” promised by the economic study of law has been captured, 
devoured, in some cases digested and in other cases regurgitated.  Still, it is highly 
likely that economic thought has influenced the legislative trend away from 
notice-filing.289  A principal goal of revised Article 9 and the securitization 
statutes appears to be to reduce transaction costs arising in commercial finance 
transactions.290
Yet it would appear that these economic arguments often ignore the difficult 
problem of understanding how information about property actually flows in 
merchant communities, and whether the rules we have (or are developing) are 
likely to produce an optimal mix of information.  They may reduce one category 
of costs (or costs to certain participants), but may inadvertently create others.
IV. Perfection in a World of Imperfect Information - Community and 
Behavioral Observations about Notice Filing
We can see thus far that the trend in commercial finance law ignores the 
intuitive link between property, information and community – the idea that 
285
 Id. at 224.
286
 Id. at 224.  
287
 Id. at 224-25.
288 See Epstein, supra note [].
289
 For example, Professor Mooney – one of the reporters for Revised Article 9 – has been known 
to engage in economically-oriented analyses.  See generally Mooney, supra note 68.
290
 See note [CROSS X EFFICIENCY CITES], supra.
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property rights come with notice obligations – and increasingly tolerates secret 
liens.  For the most part, these developments have been rooted in economic 
thinking about commercial finance law and the role that notice-filing might play 
in it.  The aggregate costs of notice-filing exceed its benefits.
This section suggests that there are other ways to understand the role of 
notice-filing.  These other understandings – rooted in the ways that information 
functions in commercial communities, and the behavioral consequences of notice-
filing -- might better explain the proper role of notice-filing – and why it should 
not be abandoned or diminished lightly.
A. Community Norms
It is easy to forget that notice-filing systems were an outgrowth of systems 
intended in part to shape communities.  As discussed in Part I.B., the title registry 
systems used in Massachusetts before the Revolution existed both to deal with 
fraudulent conveyances and to regulate the admission of new members to the 
community.291  Notice-filing can be seen in part as a response to the community 
transgression that separates property from information about it.  But community 
also implies a set of understandings about the development and distribution of 
information.  Those within a community, the idea seems to be, will have access to 
and the means of interpreting certain kinds of information.  Those who are not 
members of the community will not.
We know something about how at least some contemporary communities deal 
with information about the property rights of their members.  The work of writers 
such as Robert Ellickson292 and Lisa Bernstein293 suggest that community 
structures can often be a proxy for more formal information-generating rules 
which might govern notice-filing.
Consider Ellickson’s study of ranchers in Shasta County, California.  
Ellickson studied what may be the seminal form of verification and measurement 
problem:  Boundary disputes among adjacent landowners, specifically the 
ranchers and farmers that Coase posited in his landmark 1961 article, The 
Problem of Social Cost.294  In attempting to find out how a particular group of 
291 See discussion at notes []-[], supra.
292 Robert C. Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 52-53, 72-76 
(1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1320- 21 (1993).  Although 
Ellickson has made an enormously valuable contribution, he was not the first to study property 
rights in small communities.  See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. 
ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967) (Papers & Proc.) (family property in beaver-hunting territories 
among the Montagnes in eastern Canada with the advent of the fur trade).
293 See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant 
Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765
(1996); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).  Bernstein’s work grows 
out of a rich tradition of empirical legal analysis which emanated generally from Yale Law 
School, and found its most important early expression in Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). 
294 See Coase, supra note [].
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individuals addressed the problem of social cost, Ellickson found that neither 
traditional doctrine nor received economic wisdom would predict behavior 
accurately.  Ellickson studied the ranchers and farmers of Shasta County 
California in the early 1980s.295  As the title of the book suggests, Ellickson found 
that members of this fairly close-knit community often declined to resort to 
formal legal action when boundary disputes arose amongst members of the 
community.  
But that is not to say that formal law had no role in resolving disputes in 
Shasta County.  Ellickson observes that when the cattle wandered off the fields, 
and onto the highway, California tort law – and not the communal norms of 
cooperation – would likely resolve any dispute that arose between the owner of 
the cow and the driver of the car that might have occupied the same point in space 
and time.296  While the ranchers may not have fully understood the nature of their 
liability – they believed, despite repeated losses, that “’the motorist buys the cow 
in open range’”297 – the rest of world did.  And this liability was determined not 
the norms of the Shasta county community, but by California law on negligence, 
animals and insurance.
Based on this, among other things, Ellickson developed an intuitively 
appealing hypothesis:  “members of a close-knit group develop and maintain 
norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members 
obtain in their workaday affairs with one another.”298  In simpler terms, Ellickson 
observed, this meant that “members of tight social groups will informally 
encourage each other to engage in cooperative behavior.”299   But, the corollary 
would have to be that informality or norms-governed rule-making would be 
inappropriate when these conditions – principally the social cohesion condition –
did not obtain.  Among other things, he recognized that normatively influenced 
systems of control might tend to externalize costs to those outside the community.  
“[N]orms that add to the welfare of the members of a certain group commonly 
impoverish, to a greater extent, outsiders to that group,” he observed, citing, 
among other things, the treatment of African Americans in the presence of norms 
of racial discrimination.300
Ellickson did not discuss the financing of cattle in Shasta county, so it is not 
clear whether a more insular, norms-based system applied to the resolution of 
debtor-creditor disputes, or the more formal legal rules were assumed to apply.  
The suggestion seems to be that within the community, the norms-based regimen 
295
 Ellickson, Order, supra note [].
296
 Id. at 82.
297
 Id. 103
298
 Id. at 167 (emphasis in original).
299
 Id.  Ellickson recognized that this position resonated with works of writers as divers as 
Alexander Bickel, Lon Fuller, Frederick Hayek, Thomas Schelling, “and similar scholars who in 
diverse ways have kept alive Burkean notion that decentralized social forces contribute 
importantly to social order.”  Id. (citations omitted).
300
 Id. at 169.
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would apply.  Thus, he observed “When a notorious informal debt has been 
repaid, the party who has been made whole bears an informal duty to tell others  
that  accounts have been squared.”301  But outside the community, the suggestion 
seems to be that more traditional, baseline rules of law do and should apply.  The 
informal methods of rule generation and enforcement within the community do 
not necessarily obtain outside the community.302  It would be difficult, for
example, to imagine that agricultural lenders would rely solely on reputation, 
gossip, and informal social control to enforce their loans, or to make a decision to 
extend credit.  Within the group, informal measures may be adequate proxies for 
obtaining information about a debtor’s property.  It is hard to see that the same 
would be the case outside the group. 
Lisa Bernstein’s study of diamond merchants yields a similar suggestion.  
Bernstein sought to understand why diamond merchants, especially those in the 
New York Diamond Dealers Club, rarely resorted to established legal 
mechanisms to create contracts or to resolve disputes over them.303 Unlike 
Ellickson, Bernstein does discuss the role that credit and financing play in the 
diamond trade.304  Credit was an important component of sales among diamond 
merchants, where “bargaining over the term of payment became an important and 
contentious stage in contract negotiations.”305  According to Bernstein, payment 
terms (other than cash on delivery) were often 30- or 60- days.  These periods 
often corresponded to the time involved in finishing the stone, so Bernstein 
surmised that “sellers generally finance most, if not all, of the buyer’s 
(manufacturer’s)) cash gap.”306
Bernstein discusses the mechanics of external financing only indirectly.  She 
observes that a fairly small number of banks were involved in the diamond 
industry, because valuing diamonds was often beyond the expertise of most 
bankers.307  While diamonds may be valuable property, it would appear that the 
value of this property plays only an incidental role when banks decide to extend 
credit to insiders in the diamond industry.  Rather than collateral value, per se, 
lenders in Bernstein’s study were more concerned with merchant reputation.308
301
 Id. at 232.
302
 Id. at 283 (“As prior investigators have found in other contexts, disputants are increasingly 
likely to turn to legal rules when the social distance between them increases . . . .”).
303
 Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra note [], at 116 (“the diamond industry is unique in its 
ability to create and, more important, to enforce its own system of private law.”)
304
 She characterizes diamond markets as both a commodities market and an “implicit capital 
market.”  Id.. at 131
305
 Id. at 131
306
 Id. at 131.
307
 Id. at 154, n. 67.  She notes that at that time Merchants Bank of New York was attempting to 
develop an in-house group of gem experts with access to important intraindustry reputation 
information.  Id at 132, n. 38.
308
 Id. at 154, n. 67 (quoting banker as observing “in terms of extending credit a bank has to look 
at the three C’s – Capital, Culpability and Character.  At our bank, we think that character is the 
most important C.”)
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“[A]lthough defaulting on a loan would hurt any businessman’s credit rating,” 
Bernstein observes, “the damage to a diamond dealer is more severe since there 
are only a few industry lenders and banks must rely to greater extent on dealers’ 
reputation in valuing assets.”309
One might infer from this that information-generating rules on such things as 
notice-filing did not matter.  But it would appear that notice-filing does play a part 
in the financing of diamond transactions, especially vis a vis those outside the 
“community,” such as banks.  Bernstein observed that many transactions within 
the industry took the form of consignments – sales where the seller retains title 
under the buyer resells or returns the goods in question.  As under current law, the 
UCC in the early 1990s provided that a consignor would protect its interest in 
consigned goods if it filed an effective UCC-1 financing statement adequately 
describing the goods.310  If the consignor failed to file an effective financing 
statement, however, it would lose its rights in the goods as against a competing 
bankruptcy trustee (under the strong-arm power) or a bank with a perfected 
security interest in the buyer’s inventory.311
As an historical matter, Bernstein found that consignment agreements were 
always concluded orally.  However, Bernstein observed, this began to change as 
dealers discovered that they would lose their interest in the consigned goods if the 
buyer got into financial trouble.  Thus, the legal counsel to the DDC advised 
dealers that the UCC “will give you protection it you adequately describe your 
diamonds and file a UCC-1 Financing Statement . . . .  this will give you a legal 
leg to stand on if you unfortunately have to seek the return of your merchandise 
from a bank or a trustee in bankruptcy.”312  Thus, consignment agreements – and 
in larger transactions UCC-1 financing statements – became part of the diamond 
industry.313
Bernstein suggested that the formal consignment agreement served two 
important functions, one internal, the other external.  Internally, the consignment 
agreement would function like a bill of sale, providing evidence of what the 
transaction was supposed to have been in the event of a later dispute.314
Externally, the formal consignment agreements were critical to demonstrating the 
intentions of the parties to a court.  “Without them,” Bernstein noted “courts tend 
to interpret the meaning of an intraindustry consignment agreement in ways that 
309
 Id. at 154-55, n. 67. 
310
 U.C.C. § 2-326 (2000) (discussing rights of consignment seller); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (2001) 
(defining consignment) & 9-319  (2001) (discussing rights of consignment seller).
311
 This is another example of the “strong arm” power, discussed in part [], above.  A recent 
example of this appears in In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105,212-125 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2003)(“unperfected” consignment sellers lose priority to bankruptcy trustee). 
312
 Id. at 155, n. 69 (quoting S. Herman Klarsfeld, Legal Gems N.Y. Diamonds, May 1988, at 63).
313
 Id. at 155 (“when a dealer gives goods on consignment, a formal consignment memorandum 
that satisfies the requirements of the [UCC] is now sometimes drawn up to ensure that the 
[consignment seller’s] title to the goods will be recognized by the legal system.”)(footnote 
omitted).
314
 Id. at 155.
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are strongly at odds with industry custom and the intent of the original contracting 
parties.”315
Like the ranchers of Shasta County who collide with outsiders, Bernstein’s 
study suggests that informal, community-based methods of setting rules and 
remedies may be appropriate within a group, but not necessarily outside of it.  
Community can be a proxy for more formal methods of gathering and 
disseminating information, such as notice-filing systems.  Notice-filing may not 
matter to diamond merchants inter se, since they know (or believe they know) all 
that is important to know about one another in order to trade internally.  But the 
possibility that their transactions will have to be explained to an outsider judge or 
bank suggests that more formal informational mechanisms are still important.  Put 
another way, while the community of diamond-merchants may elect to adopt or 
reject certain commercial conventions inter se, there seems to be no doubt that 
more formal rules will govern the interface between those within the community 
and those outside of it.  Notice-filing may be an informational bridge to the 
outside world.
The work of Ellickson and Bernstein has two important lessons for the role of 
notice-filing.  First, where information about property and other credit-related 
matters (e.g., reputation for trustworthiness) is readily available to all members of 
the relevant community, it is not clear that more formal notice-filing systems are 
necessarily useful.  If all creditors of a debtor know that the debtor’s assets are 
fully encumbered by a first-priority security interest, is there any legitimate basis 
for avoiding the security interest if the financing statement perfecting the interest 
is somehow technically deficient?  If there is no secret lien in fact, who benefits 
from avoiding the security interest?
Second, and perhaps more important, where there is no information-rich 
community, in which the existence and extent of property (and other) interests are 
reasonably well understood, the more formal methods of generating and 
disseminating information about property  – e.g., notice filing – become 
increasingly important.  Thus, in simpler times, when communities were more 
closely knit, cruder signals about property were or should have been acceptable.  
On this view, the nonpossessory security interest in Clow316 and the factor’s lien in 
Ryttenberg317 should have survived challenge.  Neither case suggests that anyone –
within or without the community – lacked knowledge of the security interests in 
question. 
But as things become more complex, community structures may break down.  
Thus, the downstream buyer or licensee of data or intellectual property should not 
have to worry about the security interest of a lender several generations prior in 
the chain of interest, which is not known to the buyer’s general community and 
315
 Id. at 156.
316Recall that Clow avoided an unrecorded, nonpossessory security interest.  See discussion of 
Clow, supra notes [] – [].
317
 Recall that Ryttenberg avoided a factor’s lien despite the posting of a sign at the debtor’s 
warehouse.  See  discussion of Ryttenberg, supra notes []-[].
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which would not be discoverable by even a reasonably diligent search.  Similarly, 
it is not clear how to address the rights and expectations of those who may come 
into conflict with a control-perfected security interest.  The equipment vendors of 
the world may be sophisticated enough to understand that their borrower’s banks 
have a right of setoff, which is akin to the bilateral form of control discussed in 
part II.B., above.  But would they necessarily understand that they can lose the 
casualty value of their collateral to an undisclosed third party (e.g., in a trilateral 
control agreement)?  Should they not at least have the option to know ex ante the 
risk they are taking?
A similar analysis might inform our thinking about the role of notice-filing in 
asset securitization.  Where a transaction is well-publicized – and generally 
understood by the debtor’s community of creditors – it is not clear that notice-
filing adds much.  But the complexity of these transactions suggests that even if 
they are public, they may not be well understood.318  While notice-filing will not 
necessarily explain much about the intricacies of the transaction – it will say very 
little about it – it provides some basic information to those outside the 
community, who may be the parties with the least information about, and poorest 
understanding of, the deal.  It will at minimum create the possibility that they will 
inquire further.
B. Behavioral Implications of Notice-Filing
If community is proxy for notice-filing, what should inform our rules about 
information generation in the absence of community?  To date, the analysis has 
been dominated by the economic discussions set forth in part III above.  While 
these analyses have produced both heat and light, they also have significant 
limitations.  Perhaps the most important shortfall stems from their assumptions 
about human behavior.  Economic analysis in general has been dominated by 
rational choice theory, the view that human beings are logical maximizers of self-
interest.319 Rational choice theory describes “how people would behave if they 
followed the dictates of a series of logical axioms, [and] posits that people make 
outcome maximizing decisions.”320
318 See, e.g., Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note [].
319See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 WIS. L. 
REV. 433, 436 (“The single most important contribution that law and economics has made to the 
law is the use of a coherent theory of human decision-making (‘rational choice theory’) to 
examine how people are likely to respond to legal rules.”).
320
 Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference an the Law, 97 NW. L.. REV. 1115, 1116 
(2003) (citing Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioural Science:  Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060 –66 (2000)).
Herbert Simon describes the "economic man" who is perfectly rational as follows: 
This man is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which, if 
not absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous. He is assumed also to 
have a well-organized and stable system of preferences, and a skill in computation that 
enables him to calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are available to him, which 
of these will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale. 
Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99 (1955).
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Perhaps the most important incursion into the rational choice fortress has 
come from the field of behavioral economics, sometimes called cognitive theory.  
Emanating from the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,321 behavioral 
economists – and the many legal academics who trail in their wake322 – have 
demonstrated that human beings often make significant mistakes in judgment and 
analysis which would be inconsistent with the rational actor model.  While we 
may attempt to be rational, we often engage in what Mark Seidenfeld has aptly 
called “cognitive loafing”323 – we find mental shortcuts (“heuristics”) that help us 
make decisions.  These heuristics, however, often lead to results that are 
demonstrably at odds with what rational self-maximizers would choose.  In 
particular, these cognitive errors “plague many financial decisions,”324 including 
those involving extensions of credit.
1. Cognitive Errors
Cognitive theory literature has thus made a significant contribution to our 
understandings of borrowing behavior.  Professor Rachlinski recently catalogued 
three related cognitive biases that might lead to overinvestment in the form of 
taking on too much debt: (i) the “availability” heuristic, (ii) anchoring and (iii) 
overconfidence.325  The availability heuristic holds that we will more likely 
remember instances of overcoming hardship to pay debts than the failure to do 
so.
326
  Anchoring means that a borrower would root her decision to borrow today 
in her past ability to satisfy obligations.327  Overconfidence means that borrowers 
321 CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES, AT IX-X (DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY EDS. 2000); 
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 
39 AM. PSYCH. 341 , 342-44 (1984);  Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of 
Preferences, 246 SCI. AM. (1982);  Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect 
Theory:  Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 298 (1982); 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
211 SCI. 453 (1981);  Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice:  A 
reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991);  Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Rational choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S257-60 (1986).
322 See generally Symposium:  Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of 
Law and Human Behavior, 97 NW. U L. REV. 1075 (2003); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
(Cass Sunstein ed., 2000);  Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998);  Cass Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics:  A Progress 
Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115 (1999); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The’New’ Law and Psychology:  
A Reply to Critics, Skeptics  and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000); Gregory 
Mitchell, Taking Behaviorism Too Seriously?   The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New 
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1715 (2002).
323 Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002).
324
 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Case for Paternalism,, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1165, 1182 
(2003) (citing Donald Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:  Market 
Efficiency Revisited,  140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851 (1992))
325
 Rachlinski, supra note [], at 1183.
326
 Id. at 1183 (citations omitted).
327
 Id. (citations omitted).
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may tend to overstate their ability to foresee unfavorable economic circumstances 
which might lead to default.328  Together, these biases create “vulnerability to 
excess indebtedness” that might influence how we develop rules governing the 
rights and remedies of debtors and creditors.329
The problem of cognitive error has been studied in the context of securities 
law,330 commercial law (e.g., sales),331 and contract law.332  However, there has to 
date been no attempt to understand what these phenomena might imply for notice-
filing in commercial finance transactions.  What might the behavioral effects of 
notice-filing be?
First, the financing statement might counter the irrational optimism that comes 
from the collective force of the availability, anchoring and overconfidence biases.  
As the warning that alerts a creditor to further investigate various competing 
claims to a debtor’s property, the financing statement might slow the otherwise 
exuberant creditor from making a precipitous decision.  It might inject a level of 
caution and deliberation, forcing the creditor to consider more carefully the full 
ramifications of the credit decision.
This will more likely be true if creditors as a whole have confidence in the 
notice-filing system.  If creditors believe that the system gives them information 
about the debtor that materially aids a decision to extend credit, the system itself 
will develop a self-reinforcing authority.  Creditors will be able to use the 
328
 Id. (citations omitted).
329
 Id.
330 See, e.g., William J. Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented 
Contextual Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311 (1984); Marcel Kahan, 
Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992)
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 OR. L. 
REV. 301, 315 (2000) Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A 
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 
U. PA. L. REV. 851, 859-62 (1992); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some 
Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 
CAL. L. REV. 627, 634-41 (1996); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A 
Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133 (2000).
331 See, e.g., Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential Damages: Default 
Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339 (1998); Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance 
of Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71 (1998); Russell 
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 UNIV. CHI. 
L. REV. 1203 (2003); Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of 
Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1688 (1998).
332 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV.
211, 213-14 (1995); Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the 
Bargain Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1142-49 (1986) (showing that contracting parties rely 
on the "representativeness" and "availability" heuristics, which lead them to overestimate the 
likelihood that the terms of the contract will be performed); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of 
Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and 
Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing that cognitive errors in consumers justify 
imposing mandatory terms in health insurance contracts)
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presence – or absence -- of a filed financing statement as a kind of heuristic for 
assessing the debtor’s credit worthiness.
If, by contrast, the system is viewed as unreliable, creditors may be expected 
to react with excessive caution.  If creditors or purchasers or others who care 
about the debtor’s property have reason to believe that undisclosed interests in 
that property may be asserted against them, they will likely discount the value of 
that property, and the value of the debtor as a potential trading partner.  Whether a 
rational response to a lemons problem,333 or a biased response that impedes self-
interest, the lack of confidence in the system should, over time, affect the 
informational value of the system.  If no one believes it is accurate, no one would 
rely on it.
2. The Reflexive Function of Notice-Filing
Another behavioral implication of the notice-filing system would look not at 
the effect that giving notice has on the presumed audience for the information 
(creditors and other investors), but instead how notice-filing obligations channel 
and possibly improve the behavior of those obligated to file.  This has been an 
especially important and controversial topic in the securities law context, where 
disclosure per se – while voluminous – has not necessarily produced more 
intelligent decision-making.334  There is nevertheless a view that forcing corporate 
actors to divulge information about the firm and themselves will affect their 
behavior with respect to the firm and third parties.335  This claim has, for example, 
been made where there are social or environmental consequences to corporate 
action that might be affected or altered by disclosure.336  This “reflexive”337
function of disclosure focuses on the ways that behavior may be shaped by forced 
disclosure.  Reflexive theories of disclosure capitalize on the idea that if we are 
333
 George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 
84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 500 (“the difficulty of distinguishing good quality from bad is inherent in the 
business world.”).
334 Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light:  Information Overload and its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 419 (2003) (“the provocative implication of 
information overload is that the federal mandatory disclosure system might be more effective if it 
were scaled back-- that is to say, if less were disclosed, not more.”); Schwarcz, Complexity, supra 
note [].
335 See David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social 
Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41 (1999); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
336 See generally Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995) 
(discussing environmental disclosure from a "reflexive law" viewpoint); Perry E. Wallace, 
Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities Under the Securities Laws: The Potential of Securities-
Market-Based Incentives for Pollution Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093 (1993) (analyzing 
environmental disclosure from a market-based efficiency perspective);
337
 Reflexive law “attempts to influence decision-making and communication processes with 
required procedures.”  Hess, supra note [], at 51 (citing ERIC BREGMAN & ARTHUR JACOBSON, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: SELF-REGULATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, IN THE 
CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION 211 (Gunther Teubner et al. eds., 
1994)).
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forced to tell the world what we are doing, we may reflect more carefully on our 
than actions than would otherwise be the case.338
How might this play out when applied to the UCC-1 financing statement?  A 
debtor and secured party (or securitization financer) who have no obligation to 
inform the world that one of them (the debtor) is conveying some property to the 
other will likely treat that property differently than if disclosure, no matter how 
discursive, were required.  The property may, actually or metaphorically, be held 
out as an inducement to third parties of one sort or another (akin to reliance 
considered so distressing by the court in Clow v. Woods, discussed at the outset of 
this article).  The debtor and the secured creditor may tolerate dissipation of the 
property, or carelessness with its maintenance.  If, however, the relationship has 
been disclosed, behavior might change.
3. Binary v. Fuzzy Disclosure Rules 
The reflexive function of disclosure is, Professor Malloy recently observed, 
likely more powerful when disclosure rules are “fuzzy” rather than “binary.”339  A 
binary disclosure system is one in which compliance is “a black or white state of 
affairs.”340  Either disclosure has been given according to the prescribed rules or it 
has not.  Fuzzy disclosure, by contrast, establishes “a gray relationship between 
an indeterminate standard and an uncertain factual situation.”341  Malloy has 
argued that in the presence of ambiguity, binary disclosure rules tend to undercut 
the reflexive effects that disclosure might otherwise produce, creating 
opportunities for strategic noncompliance.  “Binary disclosure provisions simply 
task [a] manager with answering the same question all over again.”342  Fuzzy 
disclosure rules, by contrast, “challenge[] the individual to think more closely 
about the position taken than would be the case absent the disclosure 
obligation.”343
The U.C.C. notice-filing system as it has developed to can certainly be seen as 
a binary system.  As discussed in part I.B, above, the slightest technical errors in 
the giving of notice have often been used to avoid security interests entirely.  
Where notice has been required, especially under prior law, the notice was either 
effective or it was not.  The survival of the security interest was a black and white 
matter that did not turn in any meaningful sense on the actual knowledge of those 
338
 This whole approach to securities laws is nascent, and is the subject of some controversy.  See
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 
WASH. U. L. Q. ___, ___ (2004); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, And The 
Paradox Of Compliance, 52 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1343, 1407-10 (1999)(disclosure regimes may 
create false image of “corporate social responsibility”); RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME 
AND SENTENCING 867-883 (1994).
339
 Timothy Malloy, Disclosure Stories, __ Fl. St. L. Rev. __ (2004) (Mar. 22, 2004 draft at 
23).
340
 Id.
341
 Id. (citing BART KOSKO, NEURAL NETWORKS AND FUZZY SYSTEMS 3, 33  (1992).;  
MICHAEL SMITHSON, IGNORANCE AND UNCERTAINTY 108-18 (1988)).
342
 Id. at 46.
343
 Id. at 53
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transacting with the debtor.  This has not surprisingly led those who craft 
disclosure rules – the drafters of revised Article 9 and the securitization 
facilitation statutes, for example – to formulate rules that are as easy as possible to 
comply with.  The easiest disclosure rule to comply with, of course, is none at all, 
which is where our commercial finance law seems to be headed.  
A fuzzier tolerance for the real distribution of information in any given 
situation might encourage more reflexive behavior on the part of those required to 
file these notices (i.e., the debtor and secured party).  In particular, Professor 
Malloy has argued, fuzzy disclosure rules may lead to greater individual 
accountability.  This may cause greater cognitive dissonance for those responsible 
for the filing, but may also lead them to consider more carefully the full effects of 
the course of action.  This is, Malloy observes, especially important when 
disclosure might involve multiple audiences with potentially conflicting responses 
to the information in question.344  Fuzzy disclosure rules would, at least 
potentially, require individuals to “engage in [a] more sophisticated evaluation of 
the alternative positions than under a binary disclosure scenario.”345
Fuzzier disclosure rules might therefore reduce the incidents of arbitrary 
avoidance, while still channeling and perhaps improving the behavior of those 
primarily responsible for generating and filing notice.  If secured parties, in 
particular, were more concerned about who actually knew of their interest in the 
debtor’s property, and less concerned with satisfying the binary rules of notice-
filing that have developed to date, they might be less inclined to engage in 
strategic but meaningless compliance.  If, for example, a secured party could 
pursue data or intellectual property in the hands of remote parties only when the 
remote party actually knew (or had reason to know) of the proceeds security 
interest, the secured party would take steps to assure that that remote party had 
knowledge.  If a security interest in a bank account would be enforceable only if 
other creditors of the debtor had some actual or constructive knowledge of the 
bank’s interest in it, the secured party and debtor will take meaningful action to 
assure that it is known.  Fuzzier rules would permit the easy transfer of property
interests envisioned by revised Article 9 and the securitization facilitation statutes 
with a reduced possibility of secrecy.  Fuzzy rules may permit liens while 
inhibiting secrets. 
There are undoubtedly other behavioral implications of notice-filing.  The 
important point here is that the system may have behavioral consequences that 
have not been fully internalized by those proposing changes in policy. 
Conclusion 
This article has investigated the causes and effects of the elimination of 
notice-filing from common commercial finance transactions, including those 
344
 Id. at 54-55.  Malloy’s examples involve the conflicting disclosure pressures of federal 
environmental and tax laws.
345
 Id.  at 55.  There are, Malloy notes, important limits to this analysis.  Among  other  things, 
“accountability in the complex context of the business firm and regulatory environment is still 
quite young.”  Id. at 56.
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involving data, intellectual property and bank and brokerage accounts.  The 
principal cause appears to be excessive (or misplaced) concerns with economic 
efficiency. The principal effect will be increased incidence of secret liens. This 
article has suggested that secret liens may be a problem because they challenge  
deeply held intuitions about the relationship between property rights and notice 
obligations, reflected in both recent theoretical developments and long mercantile 
history. 
This article has suggested that notice-filing systems may perform at least two 
important informational functions not fully considered by critics of these systems.  
First, they will act as proxy for the information that might otherwise be generated 
within tightly-knit merchant communities.  Second, they may have important 
behavioral consequences for both those required to provide the notice and the 
audience for the information thus provided.
We may never fully understand the relationship between property, 
information, community and investment (credit) decisions.  It is, however, 
important to remember that informational systems like the notice-filing system of 
the Uniform Commercial Code perform a variety of functions which should not 
be discarded lightly.
############################################
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Annex A
UCC FINANCING STATEMENT
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY
A. NAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER [optional]
B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO:  (Name and Address)
Granada Bank and Trust Co., N.A.
25 South Harbor Street
Boston, MA 02110
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
1. DEBTOR’S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME – insert only one debtor name (1a or 1b) – do not abbreviate or combine names
1a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME
Maimonedes Medical Finance Services LLC OR
1b. INDIVIDUAL’S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
1c. MAILING ADDRESS
60 Boston Street
CITY
Baltimore
STATE
MD
POSTAL CODE
02101
COUNTRY
USA
1d. TAX ID #: SSN OR EIN ADD’L INFO RE
ORGANIZATION
DEBTOR
1e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION
LLC
1f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION
Delaware
1g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #, if any
NONE
2. ADDITIONAL DEBTOR’S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME – insert only one debtor name (2a or 2b) – do not abbreviate or combine names
2a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME
OR
2b. INDIVIDUAL’S LAST NAME’
Principal
FIRST NAME
Peter
MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
2c. MAILING ADDRESS
622 University Avenue
CITY
Baltimore
STATE
MD
POSTAL CODE
02120
COUNTRY
USA
2d. TAX ID #: SSN OR EIN ADD’L INFO RE
ORGANIZATION
DEBTOR
2e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 2f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 2g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #, if any
3. SECURED PARTY’S NAME  (or NAME of TOTAL ASSIGNEE OF ASSIGNOR S/P) – insert only one secured party name (3a or 3b)
3a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME
Granada Bank and Trust Co, .N.A.OR
3b. INDIVIDUAL’S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
3c. MAILING ADDRESS
25 South Harbor Street
CITY
Boston
STATE
MA
POSTAL CODE
02110
COUNTRY
USA
4. This FINANCING STATEMENT covers the following collateral:
Equipment, inventory, chattel paper, accounts, general intangibles
5. ALTERNATIVE DESIGNATION [if applicable]:  LESSEE/LESSOR    CONSIGNEE/CONSIGNOR     BAILEE/BAILOR    SELLER/BUYER     AG. LIEN     NON-UCC FILING
6.   This FINANCING STATEMENT is to be filed [for record] (or recorded) in the REAL
              ESTATE RECORDS. Attach Addendum                                        (if applicable)
7. Check to REQUEST SEARCH REPORT(S) on Debtor(s)
   [ADDITIONAL FEE]  [optional]  All Debtors  Debtor 1    Debtor 2
8. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE  DATA
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